

I. Introduction: Issues in Constitutional Design

- A.** In principle, the task of governmental design can be done piece meal, where one only asks how the present government can be *improved*. Or one can attempt to design a new government de novo, from the ground up.
- ◆ Real institutional designers usually address the former (improvement) rather than the later (initiation or replacement).
 - ◆ It is this which makes real constitutions evolutionary in nature, with roots in legal and institutional experience and also ideas from the distant and not so distant past.
 - ◆ However, philosophers and other political theorists enjoy wrestling with the design of a "perfect" constitution as a whole..
- B.** This has long been true, and it is evident in the two famous Greek philosophers we use as our starting point.
- ◆ What is remarkable about their 2000 year old writings is how modern they seem in most respects, and how far they penetrated into the issues of constitutional design.
- i. To appreciate the Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, you should think a bit about the European middle ages when power rather than principle largely determined governance, in which education was reserved for the nobility, and ideas of representation and citizenship were rarely if ever pressing concerns.
- ◆ It is only in the past three hundred years that we have recovered and deepened the Greek analyses of constitutions.
- ii. However, to say that "we" post enlightenment westerners have far gone beyond the Greeks, is perhaps a slight overstatement.
- ◆ Although modern political theorists have gone beyond the Greeks and the Enlightenment philosophers in many ways, be alert for questions that they took seriously, but which have been forgotten by modern political theorists.
- iii. It would not be accurate to say that Plato and Aristotle are truly the first philosophers to tackle the question of constitutional design, but they are clearly among the first to do so carefully and are among the first of those whose work has survived to the present.
- ◆ Surely, there were constitutional theorists among the Sumarians, for example, who were evidently very much concerned with good laws and good governance.
 - ◆ See for example, the legal code of Hammurabi (1775 BC) which was evidently chiseled into the walls of the courts (<http://www.lawresearch.com/v2/codeham.htm>)
- iv. However, the efforts of several Greek philosophers survived largely in tact and in a form that we can read (thanks to the efforts of translators) more than two thousand years after it was penned.
- ◆ If most modern work has been influenced by their analysis and conclusions, it is also likely that their work reflects the analysis of their teachers and older historians.

- v. Below are a series of excerpts (snippets) from Plato's *Republic* and from Aristotle's *Politics*, which seem especially relevant for analysis of constitutional design.

- ◆ They are a superset of those used in the lecture.
 - These snippets are in the order of their appearance in the two texts.
 - and include fewer of my introductory remarks and comments

II. Plato's Republic (written about 360 BCE)

- A.** The following introduction is excerpted from:

<http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.1.introduction.html>

- i. The Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of the Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. No other Dialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same perfection of style; no other shows an equal knowledge of the world, or contains more of those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not of one age only but of all.
- ◆ Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater wealth of humor or imagery, or more dramatic power.
 - ◆ Nor in any other of his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and speculation, or to connect politics with philosophy.
- ii. The Republic is the center around which the other Dialogues may be grouped; here philosophy reaches the highest point to which ancient thinkers ever attained. Plato among the Greeks, like Bacon among the moderns, was the first who conceived a method of knowledge, although neither of them always distinguished the bare outline or form from the substance of truth; and both of them had to be content with an abstraction of science which was not yet realized.
- ◆ He was the greatest metaphysical genius whom the world has seen; and in him, more than in any other ancient thinker, the germs of future knowledge are contained. The sciences of logic and psychology, which have supplied so many instruments of thought to after-ages, are based upon the analyses of Socrates and Plato.
 - ◆ The principles of definition, the law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, the distinction between the essence and accidents of a thing or notion, between means and ends, between causes and conditions; also the division of the mind into the rational, concupiscent, and irascible elements, or of pleasures and desires into necessary and unnecessary --these and other great forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic, and were probably first invented by Plato.
 - ◆ The greatest of all logical truths, and the one of which writers on philosophy are most apt to lose sight, the difference between words and things, has been most strenuously insisted on by him, although he has not always avoided the confusion of them in his own writings.
 - ◆ But he does not bind up truth in logical formulae, --logic is still veiled in metaphysics; and the science which he imagines to "contemplate all truth and all existence" is very unlike the doctrine of the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered.

- iii. Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still larger design which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as well as a political and physical philosophy.
- iv. Plato may be regarded as the "captain" ('arhchegoz') or leader of a goodly band of followers; for in the Republic is to be found the original of Cicero's De Republica, of St. Augustine's City of God, of the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary States which are framed upon the same model.
 - ♦ The extent to which Aristotle or the Aristotelian school were indebted to him in the Politics has been little recognized, and the recognition is the more necessary because it is not made by Aristotle himself.
 - ♦ The two philosophers had more in common than they were conscious of; and probably some elements of Plato remain still undetected in Aristotle.
 - ♦ (END OF INTRODUCTORY QUOTE FROM WEB-BOOK)

- B.** Snippets from Book II (Is a just life the best life? Exploration of the nature of justice in the State as a method of understanding justice .)
 - i. [i]n what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar--
 - ♦ Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?
 - ♦ For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable.
 - ♦ But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me.
 - ii. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself.
 - ♦ I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends.
 - ♦ But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy.
 - iii. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed.
 - ♦ With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs.
 - ♦ And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished.
 - iv. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled.
 - ♦ But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things --why in either case should we mind about concealment?
 - ♦ And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.'
 - ♦ Let us be consistent then, and believe both or neither.
 - v. If the poets speak truly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice;
 - ♦ for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice;
 - ♦ but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished.
 - ♦ 'But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.'

- ♦ Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power.
 - ♦ That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.
- vi. On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. ...

C. Snippets from Book II. (Study of the state as a method of learning about justice's role in the best life of an individual.)

- i. I will tell you, I replied; **justice, which is the subject of our enquiry**, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the **virtue of a State**. True, he replied.
- ♦ And is not a State larger than an individual? It is.
 - ♦ Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible.
- ii. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State,
- ♦ and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them. And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.
 - ♦ I dare say. When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered. Yes, far more easily.
- iii. But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said;
- ♦ for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a **very serious task**. Reflect therefore.

D. Snippets from Book II (Origins of the State, Economic and Military Determinants of the Minimal Size of a State)

- i. A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?
- ii. There can I be no other.
- iii. Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.
- iv. True, he said. And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under **the idea that the exchange will be for their good**. Very true.
- v. Then, I said, let us begin and **create in idea** a State; and yet the **true creator is necessity**, who is the mother of our invention.

E. Of course, he replied.

- i. Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.
- ♦ Certainly. The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like. True.
 - ♦ And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand:
 - ♦ We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver --shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?
 - ♦ Quite right. The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.
- ii. (*Perhaps more?*) Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them.
- ♦ Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves?
 - ♦ And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod.
 - ♦ They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle.
 - ♦ And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another.
 - ♦ And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.
- iii. [*and even more?*] Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient.
- ♦ Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colours;
 - ♦ another will be the votaries of music --poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses.
 - ♦ And we shall want more servants.
 - ♦ [*Education*] **Will not tutors be also in request**, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks;
 - ♦ and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now?
- iv. [*Economic Theory of War, Rent-seeking?*] Then **a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted** by us for pasture and tillage, **and they will want a slice of ours**, if, like

ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth? That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

- ◆ And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not? Most certainly, he replied.
- ◆ Then without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have **discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States**, private as well as public.
- v. And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the will be **nothing short of a whole army**, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.
- vi. [*the Guardians*] How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?
 - ◆ Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.
 - ◆ And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill, and art, and application will be needed by him? No doubt, he replied.
 - ◆ Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling? Certainly.

F. [*Nature of ideal Guardians*, from Book II]

- i. Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?
 - ◆ Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well? Certainly.
 - Whereas, I said, they ought to be **dangerous to their enemies**, and **gentle to their friends**; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.
 - ◆ [h]ow shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?
 - And where do you find them? Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.
 - ◆ Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the **qualities of a philosopher**?
 - --your dog is a true philosopher. Why? Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. ...
 - And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?
- ii. [*Education of the Guardians*.] And what shall be their education?
 - ◆ Can we find a better than the traditional sort? --and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul. True.
 - ◆ Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards? By all means.

- And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not? I do.
 - ◆ And literature may be either true or false? Yes. And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false? We cannot.
- iii. Then the first thing will be to establish a **copyright of the writers** of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; **and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only**.
 - Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.
 - ◆ A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.
 - But when is this fault committed? Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes, --as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.
 - ◆ Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true.
 - ◆ [i]t is most important that the **tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts**.
 - iv. [from book 5] Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic;
 - ◆ we were contriving **influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection**,
 - and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure --mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents.
 - And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be **courage**, unless you disagree. ...
 - ◆ And ought not the **rational principle**, which is **wise**, and has the **care of the whole soul**, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally? Certainly.
 - And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, **nering and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons**, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?
 - v. [*Inculcating the Four Virtues as the Aim of Guardian Education*, also from book 5]
 - ◆ And he is to be deemed **courageous** whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear? Right, he replied.
 - ◆ And him we call **wise** who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole? Assuredly.

- ♦ And would you not say that he is **temperate** who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?
 - Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.
- ♦ And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.
 - And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State? There is no difference in my opinion, he said.
- G.** [*Justice in man and state*, Book 5] If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver?
 - Would any one deny this? No one, he replied.
- i. Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country? Never.
 - ♦ Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements? Impossible.
 - ♦ No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father and mother, or to fall in his religious duties? No one.
 - ♦ And the reason is that **each part of him is doing its own business**, whether in ruling or being ruled? Exactly so.
 - ♦ Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other? Not I, indeed.
- ii. Then our dream has been realised; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified? Yes, certainly.
 - And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use? Clearly.
- iii. But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the **inward, which is the true self** and concernment of man:
 - ♦ for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others, --he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself;
 - ♦ and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals --when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many,
 - ♦ but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature,

- ♦ then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition,
 - ♦ just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.
- iv. You have said the exact truth, Socrates.
- ♦ Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?

H. Book II Snippets (*contractarian theory of the state, and weaknesses thereof*)

- i. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they **had better agree among themselves to have neither**;
 - ii. **hence there arise laws and mutual covenants**; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just.
 - iii. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; --it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation;
 - iv. and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice.
 - v. **For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist**; he would be mad if he did.
 - vi. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.
- I.** [*Fallibility of Man*] Suppose now that there were two such magic [*invisibility*] rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice.
- ♦ No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men.
 - ♦ Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point.
 - ♦ And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust.
 - ♦ For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right.

J. Snippet from Book II (On normative training, reputation, religion, and justice)

- i. There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning.
- ii. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but **for the sake of character and reputation**; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those **offices, marriages, and the like** which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice.
 - ♦ More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others;
 - ♦ for **they throw in the good opinion of the gods**, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just--

K. Snippets from Book III [*Selecting the Rulers--Guardians*]

- i. And as there are **two principles of human nature**, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order that these **two principles** (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonised.
- ii. And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.
 - ♦ You are quite right, Socrates. **And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last.** Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.
 - ♦ Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education:
- iii. Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask **who are to be rulers and who subjects?** Certainly.
 - ♦ There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger. Clearly.
 - ♦ And that the best of these must rule. That is also clear.
 - Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry? Yes.
 - And as we are to have the **best of guardians for our city**, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians? Yes.
 - And to this end they ought to be **wise and efficient**, and to have a special care of the State? True.
 - And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves? To be sure.
 - And he will be **most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself**, and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?
- iv. Very true, he replied. Then there must be a selection.
 - ♦ Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests. Those are the right men.
 - ♦ And they will have to be **watched at every age**, in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.
 - How cast off? he said.
 - I will explain to you, I replied.
 - **A resolution may go out of a man's mind** either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth.
- v. Therefore, as I was just now saying, **we must enquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be the rule of their lives.**
 - ♦ [*Tests of fitness for high office*] We must watch them from their youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who falls in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way? Yes.
 - And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities. Very right, he replied.
 - ♦ And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments that is the third sort of test ... and [those] retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State.
- vi. And he who at **every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State;**
 - ♦ he shall be honoured in life and death,
 - ♦ But him who fails, we must reject.
 - ♦ I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness. And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.
- vii. And perhaps the **word 'guardian' in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only** who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, or the others the power, to harm us.
 - ♦ The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.
- viii. [*a noble lie*]... I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people.

- ◆ They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us, an appearance only;
 - in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured;
 - when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up;
 - **and so, their country being their mother** and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.
- ◆ Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently.
 - Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour;

L. Snippets from Book IV (*some precursors to utilitarian analysis*)

- i. Yes, I said; and you may add that they [the *guardians*] are only fed, and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be **happiness**; and many other accusations of the same nature might be added...
- ii. Yes. If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find the answer.
 - ◆ And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class,
 - ◆ but the greatest happiness of the whole;
 - ◆ we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find Justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier.
- iii. **At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole**; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State.

M. More Snippets from Book IV (*On the Nature of Happiness, Coercion and the Distribution of Happiness*)

- i. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State.
 - ◆ But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State.
- ii. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or **whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole.**

- iii. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas **our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival**, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State.
 - ◆ But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State.
- iv. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole.
 - ◆ But the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way.
 - ◆ And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the **proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.**

N. More Snippets from Book IV (*A Digression on Wealth and Workmanship, a defense of the middle class.*)

- i. What may that be? There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.
- ii. What are they? Wealth, I said, and poverty.
- iii. How do they act?
 - ◆ The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?
 - ◆ Certainly not. He will grow more and more indolent and careless?
 - ◆ Very true. And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter? Yes; he greatly deteriorates.
 - ◆ But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.
 - ◆ Certainly not. Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?
 - ◆ That is evident.
- iv. **Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch**, or they will creep into the city unobserved.
 - ◆
- v. Yes, he said; that is not so difficult. The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the **one great thing**, --a thing, however, which I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for our purpose.
 - ◆ What may that be? he asked.
 - ◆ Education, I said, and nurture:

- ◆ If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.

O. More Snippets from Book IV (The 4 virtues and 3 principles of a man and of a state)

- Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other **virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom** are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, **justice would be the fourth** or remaining one.
- If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State,
 - ◆ whether the **agreement of rulers and subjects**,
 - ◆ or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers,
 - ◆ or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers,
 - ◆
- First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual.
 - ◆ That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found
 - ◆
 - ◆ This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.
 - ◆
 - ◆ And a State was thought by us to be just when the **three classes** in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be **temperate and valiant and wise** by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes
 - ◆
- And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.
 - ◆ Exactly. Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise? Certainly.
 - ◆

- ◆ Must **not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles --a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority**, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal, --what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?
 - ◆ Exactly so. And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?
 - ◆ What do you mean? he said. Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.
 - ◆
 - ◆ And the **division of labour** which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a **shadow of justice**, and for that reason it was of use?
- Clearly. But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others, --he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself;
 - ◆ and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals --when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature,
 - ◆ then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.
 - You have said the exact truth, Socrates. Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?
 - ◆ Most certainly not.

P. More Snippets from Book IV (The 5 or 3 forms of the State)

- What do you mean? he said. I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State.
- How many? There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.
- What are they?

- ♦ The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.
- ♦ True, he replied. But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained.

Q. Snippets from Book V (Equal Opportunity)

- i. Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education?
- ii. Yes. The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.
- iii. Yes. Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, which they must practice like the men?
- iv. That is the inference, I suppose.
 - ♦ I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.
 - ♦ No doubt of it.
 - ♦ Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia.

R. Snippet from Book 5 (Elitism)

- i. I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?
- ii. By far the best. And will not their wives be the best women? Yes, by far the best. And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?
- iii. There can be nothing better. *[the above equal opportunity]*
- iv. And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such manner as we have described, will accomplish?
- v. Certainly. Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?

S. Snippet from Book 5 (Population Control)

- i. Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population?

- ii. There are many other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, **in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small.**

T. Snippet from Book 5 (Communal Families as a source of common interest)

- i. Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be with me it is well' or 'it is ill.'
- ii. Most true. And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?
- iii. Yes, and so they will. And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?
- iv. Yes, far more so than in other States. And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?
- v. That will be the chief reason. **And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?**
- vi. That we acknowledged, and very rightly. **Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?**

U. Snippet from Book 5 [*Possible difference between the ideal and real state, possibility for useful reforms of existing states.*]

- i. Then **you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal:**
- ii. if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented.
 - I am sure that I should be contented --will not you? Yes, I will.
- iii. Let me next endeavour to show **what is that fault** in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and **what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form;**
 - ♦ and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible. Certainly, he replied.
 - ♦ I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only **one change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.** What is it? he said. ...
- iv. [*The crucial reform=philosopher kings*] I said: **Until philosophers are kings,** or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and

political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, **cities will never have rest from their evils,**

- --nor the human race, as I believe,
 - --and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.
 - ◆ Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant;
 - for to be convinced that **in no other State can there be happiness private or public** is indeed a hard thing. ...
- v. [w]e must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves:
- ◆ There will be discovered to be **some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State;**
 - ◆ and **others who are not** born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.

V. Snippet from Book 8 (Overview: the ruling aristocracy: the guardians)

- i. And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and **the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?**
- ii. That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.
- iii. Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that **the governors**, when appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and **contain nothing private**, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we agreed?
- iv. Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, **receiving from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance**, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.
- v. *(Does this remind you of senior government officials today, who receive housing food and transportation?)*

W. Snippet from Book 8 (The **four inferior kinds of government**/constitution)

- ◆ I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.
- i. That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke,
 - ◆ so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and Sparta, which are generally applauded;

- ◆ what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils:
 - ◆ thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different:
 - ◆ and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State.
- ii. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character.
 - ◆ There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some **other intermediate forms** of government.
 - ◆ But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.

X. Snippet from Book 8 (Utilitarian Comparative politics: judging societies by their relative happiness)

- i. If the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five? Certainly.
 - ◆ Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have already described.
 - ◆ Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical.
- ii. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able **to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice**. The enquiry will then be completed.
 - ◆ And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.
- iii. First, then, I said, let us inquire how timocracy (the government of honor) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best).
 - ◆ Clearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a **government which is united, however small, cannot be moved**.
- iv. Instability of the ideal city-state
 - ◆ When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things.
 - ◆ There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.
 - ◆ I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.

- ♦ And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?
 - ♦ True. But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace;
 - ♦ and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars --this State will be for the most part peculiar.
 - ♦ And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true
 - ♦ And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money; they honor and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonor the poor man.
 - ♦ They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the **qualification of citizenship**; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government.
 - ♦ These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.
- v. And then **democracy** comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.
- ♦ Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.
 - ♦ And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.
 - ♦ Clearly, he said. In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness --a man may say and do what he likes? 'Tis said so, he replied.
- vi. And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases? Clearly.
- ♦ Then in this kind of State there will be the **greatest variety of human natures**? There will.
 - ♦ This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower.
 - ♦ And just as women and children think a variety of colors to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, **will appear to be the fairest of States**.
- vii. Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.
- ♦ Because of the liberty which reigns there --they have a complete assortment of constitutions;
 - ♦ **and he who has a mind to establish a State**, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them,
 - ♦ and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State. (*Tiebout?*)
 - ♦ He will be sure to have patterns enough.
 - ♦ And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed --there being no necessity also,
 - ♦ because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy --is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful
 - ♦ For the moment, yes.
 - ♦ And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming?
 - ♦ Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world --the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?
- Y. Another Snippet from Book 8 (*Decadence and the End of Democracy*)
- i. And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.
- ♦ Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.
 - ♦ After this he lives on, spending his money and labor and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over--supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors -
 - ♦ in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn;
 - ♦ and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.
 - ♦ And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy --I mean, after a sort?
- ii. And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?

- ♦ Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share. And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?
 - ♦ What else can they do? And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy? True.
 - ♦ And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.
 - ♦ That is exactly the truth. Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another. True.
 - ♦ **The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.** Yes, that is their way.
- iii. (*Rise of Tyranny from Democracy*) This and no other is the root from which a **tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector.**
- ♦ Yes, that is quite clear. How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant?
 - ♦ Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus. What tale? The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it? Oh, yes.
 - ♦ And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen;
 - ♦ by the **favorite method of false accusation** he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizen;
 - ♦ some he kills and others he banishes,
 - ♦ at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands:
 - ♦ and after this, what will be his destiny?
 - ♦ Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a **man become a wolf --that is, a tyrant?**
- iv. (*Tyranny*)
- ♦ But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then **he is always stirring up some war** or other, in order that the people may require a leader. To be sure.
 - ♦ Has he not also another object, which is that they may be **impoverished by payment of taxes**, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him? Clearly.
 - ♦ And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority,
- ♦ he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.
 - ♦ Now he begins to grow unpopular. A necessary result.
 - ♦ Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done.
- v. Yes, that may be expected. **And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop** while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.
- ♦
 - ♦ Tyrants are wise by living with the wise; and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions.
 - ♦ Yes, he said, and he (*Euripides*) **also praises tyranny as godlike**; and many **other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.**
- vi. (*Summary of Plato's argument against democracy*) Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is,
- ♦ the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves.
 - ♦ Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.
- Z. (*RDC Note*) *So in the end it is stability or long term happiness, evidently, that makes an aristocracy better than a democracy. Note also the basic comparative argument is utilitarian and even has contractarian roots.*

III. Aristotle's *the Politics* (written about 350 BCE)

A. [On the highest of all goods, from the *N. Ethics*, book 1] Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say **political science aims at** and **what is the highest of all goods achievable by action**. Verbally **there is very general agreement**; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say **that it is happiness**, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension.

B. (From the *Politics* Book 2) Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life.

- i. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light.
- ii. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

C. Book 1 part 1 [The scientific analysis of politics]

- i. [G]overnments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the **method which has hitherto guided us**.
- ii. **As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole.**
- iii. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.

D. Book 1 part 2 [*the State of Nature*]

- i. He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them.
 - ♦ In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved.)

- ♦ Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says, "First house and wife and an ox for the plough, " for the ox is the poor man's slave.
 - ♦ But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.'
 - ♦ And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood..
 - ♦ When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.
- ii. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end.
 - ♦ The proof that the state is a creation of nature and **prior to the individual** is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.
 - iii. Hence it is evident that **the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal**.
 - ♦ But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state.
 - ♦ A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors.
 - ♦ For **man, when perfected, is the best of animals**, but, when separated from law and justice, he **is the worst of all**; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends.
 - ♦ But **justice is the bond of men in states**, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

E. Book 1 part 3 (*Existance of Controversy on the Nature of Slavery*)

- i. Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present.
- ii. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same.
- iii. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the **distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature**; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.

- ♦ Hence, we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession.
- iv. [On Natural Slaves, from part 4] But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?
- ♦ There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
 - ♦ Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.
 - ♦ For he who can be, and therefore is, another's and **he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature.**
- v. [Legal as Opposed to Natural Slavery, from part 6] But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen.
- ♦ For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses.
 - ♦ There is a slave or **slavery by law as well as by nature.**
 - ♦ For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave.
 - ♦ We see then that there is some **foundation for this difference of opinion**, and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature.
- vi. [Book 1, part 7, Difference between political rule and slave-master relationship] The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the **rule of a master is not a constitutional rule**, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same with each other.
- ♦ For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves.
 - ♦ **The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals.**
- F. Book 1 part 9 [The Emergence of Property, Trade, and Money.]**
- i. For the members of the family originally had all things in common;
- ii. later, when the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted,
- ♦ a **kind of barter** which is still practiced among barbarous nations who exchange with one another the **necessaries of life** and nothing more;

- ♦ giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for coin, and the like.
 - ♦ This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men's natural wants.
- iii. The other or **more complex form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler.**
- ♦ When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, **money necessarily came into use.**
 - ♦ For the various necessities of life are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like.
 - ♦ Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of time they **put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble** of weighing and to mark the value.
- iv. [On the limits of measuring wealth using money]
- ♦ Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated.
 - ♦ Indeed, riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth and retail trade are concerned with coin.
 - ♦ Others maintain that **coined money is a mere sham**, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is **not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life**,
 - ♦ and, indeed, **he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food.**
- v. Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right.
- G. (From Book 2) We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject.**
- i. Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and some not.
- ♦ That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate have a common place- one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one city.
 - ♦ But should a well ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not others?
 - ♦ For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato.
- ii. Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society?
- ♦ Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting,

- ♦ which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.
- iii. (A Remark about Political Science, part 10) **For as political science does not make men, but takes them from nature and uses them.**
- iv. (A Remark about Constitutional Governance, part 12) But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns.
 - ♦ **for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all.**
 - ♦ Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan.

H. (From Books 1 and 2) Aristotle's Explicit Critique of Plato

- i. (Book 1, part 13, on Natural Inequality) So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty.
 - ♦ Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and **rational principle is such an artificer**;
 - ♦ the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them.
 - ♦ Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are **not, as Socrates maintained**, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying.
- ii. (from Book 2) There are many difficulties in (Plato's) community of women.
 - ♦ And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is not established by his arguments.
 - ♦ Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated.
 - ♦ I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the better.'
- iii. Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?
 - ♦ Since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family.
 - ♦ So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state.

- iv. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state.
 - ♦ It is not like a military alliance
 - ♦ The usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort of life);
 - ♦ but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ in kind.
- v. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states.
 - ♦ Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession.
 - ♦ The result is that upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters.
 - ♦ And since it is better that this should be so in politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the same persons in power where this is possible,
 - ♦ yet where this is not possible by reason of the **natural equality of the citizens**, and at the same time it is just that all should share in the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad).
- vi. An approximation to this is that **equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position, be treated alike.**
 - ♦ Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons.
- vii. In like manner when they hold office there is **a variety in the offices held.**
 - ♦ Hence it is evident that a city is **not by nature one** in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities (by Plato) is in reality their destruction.
 - ♦ But surely the good of things must be that which preserves them.
 - ♦ Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family,
 - ♦ and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing.
 - ♦ If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.
- viii. But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time,' which, according to Socrates, is the sign of perfect unity in a state.

- ◆ For the word 'all' is ambiguous.
 - If the meaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his wife, and so of his property and of all that falls to his lot.
 - This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had their wives and children in common; they would say 'all' but not 'each.'
- ◆ In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively.
- ix. There is an obvious **fallacy** in the term 'all': like some other words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and even in abstract argument becomes a source of logical puzzles.
 - ◆ That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is **impracticable**;
 - ◆ or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity in no way conducive to harmony.
 - ◆ And there is another objection to the proposal.
- x. (*Public goods problem of communal families*) For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.
 - ◆ Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual.
 - ◆ For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill;
 - ◆ as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few.
 - ◆ Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike.
- xi. Further, upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' of one who is prospering or the reverse,
 - ◆ however small a fraction he may himself be of the whole number; the same boy will be 'so and so's son,' the son of each of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the citizens;
 - ◆ and even about this he will not be positive; for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But which is better— for each to say 'mine' in this way, making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the word 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense?
 - ◆
 - ◆ This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel.

I. (Book II of the Politics) Aristotle on **Private Property**

- i. Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property: should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not?
- ii. This question may be discussed separately from the enactments about women and children. Even supposing that the women and children belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common?
- iii. Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is the practice of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private use; this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or (3), the soil and the produce may be alike common.
- iv. When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble.
 - ◆ If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much.
- v. But indeed **there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common**, but especially in their having common property.
 - ◆ The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which turns up.
 - ◆ So with servants: we are most able to take offense at those with whom we most frequently come into contact in daily life.
- vi. These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems.
 - ◆ Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private;
 - ◆ for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will **make more progress**, because every one will be attending to his own business.
- vii. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.'
 - ◆ Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further.
 - ◆ For, although every man has his own property, some things **he will place at the disposal of his friends**, while of others he shares the use with them.
 - The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the country.

- viii. **It is clearly better that property should be private**, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition.
- J. Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established or existing ones than either of Plato's.
- No one else has introduced such novelties as the community of women and children, or public tables for women: other legislators begin with what is necessary.
 - In the opinion of some, the regulation of **property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn.**
- K. (In book II, Aristotle also suggests in passing that: "Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who **invented the art of planning cities**, and who also laid out the Piraeus- a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general eccentricity of life, ... he, besides aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, was the **first person not a statesman who made inquiries about the best form of government.**)
- The remainder of book 2 analyzes several existing constitutions of Greek city states. Evidently, there were many more of these in the original *Politics*, but most of these have been lost.
- L. From Book II, part 8 (*On Changing the Law, part of Aristotle's critique of the Republic of Hippodamus*)
- Hence **we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed**; but when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be required.
 - For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, **when the advantage is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left**; the citizen will not gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience.
 - The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art.
 - For the **law has no power to command obedience except that of habit**, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law.
 - Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state?
 - And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons?
 - These are very important questions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion.
- M. From Book II, part 9 [Women and the Law]
- For, a husband and wife being each a part of every family,
 - the state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women;
 - and, therefore, **in those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no laws.**
- N. (Snippet from Book 3 of the Politics) He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of governments must first of all determine '**What is a state?**'
- At present this is a disputed question.
 - Some say that the state has done a certain act; others, no, not the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant.
 - And the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state; a constitution or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state.
 - But a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts; these are the citizens, who compose it.
 - It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term?
- O. (Snippets from Book 3) What is a Citizen?
- Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen any other accidental manner,
 - we may say, first, that a **citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place**, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty.
 - Nay, resident aliens in many places do not possess even such rights completely, for they are obliged to have a patron, so that they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register, or to old men who have been relieved from state duties.
 - Of these we do not say quite simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the other, that they are past the age, or something of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear.
 - Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles.
 - But the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a **citizen in the strictest sense**, against whom no such exception can be taken, and **his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices.**

- ◆ Now of offices some are discontinuous, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time- for example, the office of a dicast or ecclesiast.
 - ◆ It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share in the government.
 - ◆ But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the power do not govern.
 - ◆ Let us not dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question; what we want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast.
 - ◆ Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it '**indefinite office**,' and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the **most comprehensive definition of a citizen**, and best suits all those who are generally so called.
- iv. The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states.
- ◆ For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates.
 - ◆ At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates.
 - ◆ A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.
 - ◆ We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include these states.
 - ◆ In them it is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things.
- v. The conception of the citizen (*and state*) now begins to clear up.
- ◆ **He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizens of that state;**
 - ◆ and, speaking generally, **a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.**
- vi. (*Failings of usual legal definition*) In practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more ancestors.
- ◆ This is a short and practical definition but there are some who raise the further question:
 - ◆ How this third or fourth ancestor came to be a citizen?
 - Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said- 'Mortars are what is made by the mortar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are those who are made by the magistrates; for it is their trade to make Larissaeans.'
 - ◆ Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the definition just given they shared in the government, they were citizens.
 - ◆ **This is a better definition** than the other.

- For the words, 'born of a father or mother who is a citizen,' **cannot possibly apply** to the first inhabitants or founders of a state. ...
- It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single city- what is the limit?

P. (More snippets from Book 3, part 3) *A contractarian theory of the state, in passing*

- i. For, since **the state is a partnership**, and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same,
- ◆ just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical.
 - ◆ And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters;
 - for example, a scale containing the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed.
- ii. And if this is true it is evident that **the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution**,
- ◆ and it may be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely different.
 - ◆ It is quite another question, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfill engagements when the form of government changes.

Q. (More snippets from book 3) Whether the **virtue of a good man and a good citizen** is the same or not.

- i. But, before entering on this discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the virtue of the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community.
- ◆ Now, sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and while the precise definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them all.
 - ◆ For they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation.
- ii. Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all.
- ◆ This community is the constitution; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member.
 - ◆ If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there is not one single virtue of the good citizen which is perfect virtue.
 - ◆ But we say that the good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue.

iii. Hence it is evident that **the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.**

- ◆ (Another attack on Plato who made all the guardians men and women of the highest possible virtue, he continues with the attack below.)
- And, although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will include both; for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a subject,
- ◆ e.g., his justice, will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of men and women differ.
- For a man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman,
- and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man;
- and indeed their part in the management of the household is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve.
- ◆ Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues must equally belong to ruler and subject.
- The virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion;
- he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while **his master is like the flute-player** or user of the flute.
- From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far different.

R. (More snippets from book 3 part 4) Definition of a constitution

i. **A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially of the highest of all.**

- ◆ The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and **the constitution is in fact the government.**
- ◆ For example, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of government also are different: and so in other cases.

ii. First, let us consider what is the **purpose of a state**, and how many forms of government there are by which human society is regulated.

- ◆ We have already said, in the first part of this treatise, when discussing household management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a political animal.
- ◆ And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together;
- ◆ but that they are also brought together by their **common interests** in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. *(the productive state again)*

◆ **This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states.**

- And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together and maintain the political community.
- And we all see that men cling to life even at the cost of enduring great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness.

iii. There is no difficulty in distinguishing the **various kinds of authority**; they have been often defined already in discussions outside the school.

- ◆ The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him.
- ◆ On the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called household management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists themselves.
- The trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care. But, when he is one of the persons taken care of, he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training.

iv. And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns.

- ◆ Formerly, as is natural, every one would take his turn of service;
- ◆ and then again, somebody else would look after his interest, just as he, while in office, had looked after theirs.
- ◆ But **nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office.**
- One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; in that case we may be sure that they would be hunting after places.
- ◆ The conclusion is evident: that **governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice**, and are therefore **true forms**;
- but **those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective** and perverted forms, for they are despotic,
- whereas a **state is a community of freemen.**

S. (More Snippets from Book 3, part 7) The Types of Government

- i. We have next to consider how many forms of government there are, and what they are; and in the first place what are the true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of them will at once be apparent.

- ii. The **words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many.**
- iii. The **true forms of government**, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest;
 - ◆ but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions.
 - ◆ For the members of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in its advantages.
- iv. Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests,
 - ◆ kingship or royalty;
 - ◆ that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens.
 - ◆ **But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name- a constitution.**
- v. And there is a reason for this use of language.
 - One man or a few may excel in virtue;
 - but as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind of virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses.
 - Hence in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.
- vi. Of the above-mentioned forms, **the perversions are as follows:**
 - ◆ of royalty, tyranny;
 - ◆ of aristocracy, oligarchy;
 - ◆ of constitutional government, democracy.
 - ◆ *For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all.*
- vii. But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each of them.
 - ◆ For he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particular.
 - Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy exercising the rule of a master over the political society;
 - oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands;
 - democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers.
 - ◆ And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it relates to the distinction drawn.

- For democracy is said to be the government of the many.
 - But what if the many are men of property and have the power in their hands?
 - In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power in their hands because they are stronger?
 - **In these cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government would no longer hold good.**
- viii. Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly- an oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers- there will still be a difficulty.
 - ◆ For, if the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those other governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their respective states?
 - ◆ The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in democracies, the number of the governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, **is an accident** due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous.
 - But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them.
 - ◆ **For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth.**
 - Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy.
 - But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do,
 - whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, **and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.**

T. (more from book 3, part 9)

- i. It is clear then that a state is not a mere society [*it has*] a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange.
 - ◆ These are conditions without which a state cannot exist;
 - ◆ but all of them together do not constitute a state,
 - ◆ which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life.
- ii. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry.
 - ◆ Hence arise in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together.
 - ◆ But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship.
 - ◆ **The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it.**
 - ◆ And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life.

- iii. Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. (*Continues attack on Plato*)
- ◆ Hence they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political virtue;
 - ◆ or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.
 - From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms of government speak of a part of justice only.

U. (More snippets from book 3, part 11) *A defense of popular sovereignty and constitutional democracy*

- i. The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth.
- ◆ For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse.
 - ◆ For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together, they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a figure of their mind and disposition.
 - ◆ Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and **among them they understand the whole**.
 - ◆ There is a similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities,
 - ◆ because in them the scattered elements are combined, although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture.
 - ◆ Whether this principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear.
 - ◆ (more from part 15) Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little.
 - The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then his judgment is necessarily perverted;
 - but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment.
 - Let us assume that they are the freemen, and that they never act in violation of the law, but fill up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave.
 - Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, or the many who are all good?

V. (Snippets from Book 3, part 12) *On Equality*

- i. In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all- this is the political science of which the good is justice, in other words, **the common interest**.
- ii. All men think **justice to be a sort of equality**; and to a certain extent they agree in the philosophical distinctions which have been laid down by us about Ethics.
- ◆ For they admit that justice is a thing and has a relation to persons,
 - ◆ and that equals ought to have equality.
- iii. But there still remains a question: equality or inequality of what?
- ◆ Here is a difficulty which calls for political speculation.
 - For very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen,
 - although there is no other difference between him and the rest of the community;
 - for that those who differ in any one respect have different rights and claims.
 - ◆ But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or any other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political rights.

W. (*Book 3, part 12 continues with a very nice attack on "Noble Birth," and suggestion of a meritocracy--you can see why this was such a radical book when it was rediscovered post renaissance.*)

- i. The error here lies upon the surface, and may be illustrated from the other arts and sciences
- ◆ When a number of flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them;
 - ◆ for they will not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior artist.
 - ◆ If what I am saying is still obscure, it will be made clearer as we proceed.
 - For if there were a superior flute-player who was far inferior in birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater good than the art of flute-playing, and may excel flute-playing in a greater ratio than he excels the others in his art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him,
 - unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute-playing, which they do not.
- ii. Moreover, upon this principle any good may be compared with any other.
- ◆ For if a given height may be measured wealth and against freedom, height in general may be so measured.
 - ◆ Thus if A excels in height more than B in virtue, even if virtue in general excels height still more, all goods will be commensurable;
 - ◆ for if a certain amount is better than some other, it is clear that some other will be equal.

- ◆ But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that there is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than in the arts.
- For if some be slow, and others swift, that is no reason why the one should have little and the others much;
- it is in gymnastics contests that such excellence is rewarded.
- ◆ Whereas the rival claims of **candidates for office** can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state.
- And therefore the noble, or freeborn, or rich, may with good reason claim office;
- for holders of offices must be freemen and taxpayers:
- a state can be no more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves.
- ◆ **But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so;**
- **for without the former qualities a state cannot exist at all,**
- **without the latter not well.**

X. (Snippets from book 3, part 16) On the limits of Monarchy

- i. For every ruler who has been trained by the law judges well; and it would surely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, or act better with two hands or feet, than many with many;
 - ◆ indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make to themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet.
 - ◆ For they make colleagues of those who are the friends of themselves and their governments.
- ii. They must be friends of the monarch and of his government; if not his friends, they will not do what he wants;
 - ◆ but friendship implies likeness and equality;
 - ◆ and, therefore, if he thinks that his friends ought to rule, he must think that those who are equal to himself and like himself ought to rule equally with himself.
 - ◆ (*e. g. as an aristocracy*)
 - ◆ These are the principal controversies relating to monarchy.

Y. (Snippets from book 3, part 17) On the people most apt to produce Monarchic, Aristocratic and Democratic governments.

- i. A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in the virtue needed for political rule are fitted for kingly government;
- ii. and a people submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy;
- iii. while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom are those among whom there naturally exists a warlike multitude able to rule and to obey in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their desert.

iv. (*Is this true of modern Europe and America?*)

Z. (Related Snippets from Book 4, part 2, of the Politics) On the Ideal of Virtue-based government, a summary (king and aristocracy are the best, virtue being scarce):

- i. Of kingly rule and of aristocracy, we have already spoken, for the inquiry into the **perfect state is the same thing with the discussion of the two forms thus named, since both imply a principle of virtue provided with external means.**
- ii. We have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the latter should be established.
- iii. (Other remarks on democracy, from book 4, part 4) **It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that democracy is simply that form of government in which the greater number are sovereign, for in oligarchies, and indeed in every government, the majority rules;**
 - ◆ nor again is oligarchy that form of government in which a few are sovereign.
 - ◆ (*Illustration of Aristotle's use of hypothetical models*)
 - Suppose the whole population of a city to be 1300, and that of these 1000 are rich, and do not allow the remaining 300 who are poor, but free, and in an other respects their equals, a share of the government- no one will say that this is a democracy.
 - In like manner, if the poor were few and the masters of the rich who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government, in which the rich majority have no share of office, an oligarchy.
 - ◆ Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers, and oligarchy in which the rich;
 - ◆ it is only an accident that the free are the many and the rich are the few.
 - Otherwise a government in which the offices were given according to stature, as is said to be the case in Ethiopia,
 - or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy; for the number of tall or good-looking men is small.
 - ◆ And yet oligarchy and democracy are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom.
 - ◆ Both of them contain many other elements, and therefore we must carry our analysis further, and say that the government is not a democracy in which the freemen, being few in number, rule over the many who are not free, as at Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera;
 - (for in each of these states the nobles, who were also the earliest settlers, were held in chief honor, although they were but a few out of many).
 - Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government because they exceed in number; as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed of large property before the Lydian War.

- But the form of government is a democracy when the free, who are also poor and the majority, govern, and an oligarchy when the rich and the noble govern, they being at the same time few in number.
 -
 - iv. *On the various kinds of democracies.*
 - ◆ For in democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up.
 - ◆ For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power in their hands, not as individuals, but collectively.
 - ◆ This sort of democracy, which is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot;
 - the flatterer is held in honor; this sort of democracy being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy.
 - The spirit of both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens.
 - The decrees of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other.
 - Both have great power; the flatterer with the tyrant, the demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are describing. The demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws, by referring all things to the popular assembly.
 - And therefore they grow great, because the people have all things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes of the people, who are too ready to listen to them.
 - Further, those who have any complaint to bring against the magistrates say, 'Let the people be judges'; the people are too happy to accept the invitation; and so the authority of every office is undermined.
 - **Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all;** for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this should be considered a constitution.
 - v. (From book 4, part 6) When the class of husbandmen and of those who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the government is administered according to law.
 - ◆ **For the citizens being compelled to live by their labor have no leisure; and so they set up the authority of the law, and attend assemblies only when necessary**
 -
- AA. (Snippets from Book 4, part 1, of the Politics) **The necessity of political science.**
- i. In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject, and do not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a single art or science to consider all that appertains to a single subject.

- ii. Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject of a single science, which has to consider what government is best and of what sort it must be, to be most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were no external impediment, and also what kind of government is adapted to particular states.
- iii. For the best is often unattainable, and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with (1) that which is best in the abstract, but also with (2) that which is best relatively to circumstances.
 - ◆ We should be able further to say how a state may be constituted under any given conditions (3); both how it is originally formed and, when formed, how it may be longest preserved; the supposed state being so far from having the best constitution that it is unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the best; neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of an inferior type.
 - ◆ He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of government which is best suited to states in general; for political writers, although they have excellent ideas, are often unpractical. (*Another attack on Plato?*)
- iv. We should consider, not only what form of government is best, but also what is possible and what is easily attainable by all.
 - ◆ There are some who would have none but the most perfect; for this many natural advantages are required.
 - ◆ Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the constitution under which they are living, they extol some one in particular, for example the Lacedaemonian.
- v. **Any change of government which has to be introduced should be one which men, starting from their existing constitutions, will be both willing and able to adopt,** since there is quite as much trouble in the reformation of an old constitution as in the establishment of a new one, just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn. (*Echos of Buchanan, 1976, but 2400+ years earlier*)
 - ◆ And therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the statesman already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existing constitutions, as has been said before.

AB. (Snippets from Book 4, part 1, of the Politics) **Choosing the Best Feasible Form of Government**

- i. This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of government there are.
 - ◆ It is often supposed that there is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy.
 - ◆ But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways they are combined.
 - ◆ The same political insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best, and which are suited to different constitutions;

- ♦ **for the laws are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws.**
 - ii. [Another clearer definition of a constitution, Book 4 part1] **A constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each community.**
 - ♦ But laws are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution;
 - ♦ they are the **rules** according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders.
 - ♦ So that we must know the varieties, and the number of varieties, of each form of government, if only with a view to making laws.
 - ♦ For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all democracies, since there is certainly more than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy.
 - iii. It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, and which is the next in badness.
 - ♦ That which is the perversion of the first and most divine is necessarily the worst.
 - ♦ And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, so tyranny, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily the farthest removed from a well-constituted form;
 - ♦ oligarchy is little better, for it is a long way from aristocracy,
 - ♦ and democracy is the most tolerable of the three.
 - iv. (*More on Plato*) A writer who preceded me has already made these distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine.
 - ♦ For he lays down the principle that when all the constitutions are good (the oligarchy and the rest being virtuous), democracy is the worst, but the best when all are bad.
 - ♦ Whereas we maintain that they are in any case defective, and that one oligarchy is not to be accounted better than another, but only less bad.
- AC.** (Book 4 parts 8) **I will proceed to consider constitutional government;** of which the nature will be clearer now that oligarchy and democracy have been defined.
- i. For polity or constitutional government may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy;
 - ♦ but the term is usually applied to those forms of government which incline towards democracy,
 - ♦ and the term aristocracy to those which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.
 - Moreover, the rich already possess the external advantages the want of which is a temptation to crime, and hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen.

- And inasmuch as aristocracy seeks to give predominance to the best of the citizens, people say also of oligarchies that they are composed of noblemen and gentlemen.
- ii. Now it appears to be an impossible thing that the state which is governed not by the best citizens but by the worst should be well-governed, and equally impossible that the state which is ill-governed should be governed by the best.
 - ♦ But we must remember that **good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government.**
- iii. Hence there are two parts of good government;
 - ♦ one is the actual obedience of citizens to the laws,
 - ♦ the other part is the goodness of the laws which they obey;
- iv. The distribution of offices according to merit is a special characteristic of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy is virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy, and freedom of a democracy.
 - ♦ In all of them there of course exists *the right of the majority*, and whatever seems good to the majority of those who share in the government has authority.

AD. (Snippets from book 4, parts 8 and 9) On *the ideal constitution of mixed governments*

- i. Now **in most states the form called polity exists**, for the **fusion** goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich, who commonly take the place of the noble.
 - ♦ But as there are three grounds on which men claim an equal share in the government, **freedom, wealth, and virtue** (for the fourth or good birth is the result of the two last, being only ancient wealth and virtue),
 - ♦ it is clear that the admixture of the two elements, that is to say, of the rich and poor, is to be called a polity or constitutional government;
 - ♦ **and the union of the three is to be called aristocracy** or the government of the best, and more than any other (*feasible*) form of government, except the true and ideal, has a right to this name.
- ii. Next we have to consider how by the side of oligarchy and democracy the so-called polity or constitutional government springs up, and how it should be organized.
 - ♦ The nature of it will be at once understood from a comparison of oligarchy and democracy;
 - ♦ we must ascertain their different characteristics, and taking a portion from each, put the two together, like the parts of an indenture.
- iii. (*Selecting legislative assemblies*) Now there are **three modes in which fusions of government may be affected.**
 - ♦ In the first mode we must combine the laws made by both governments, say concerning the administration of justice.

- In oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as judges, and to the poor they give no pay;
- but in democracies they give pay to the poor and do not fine the rich.
- ◆ Now (1) the union of these two modes is a common or middle term between them, and is therefore characteristic of a constitutional government, for it is a combination of both. This is one mode of uniting the two elements.
- ◆ Or (2) a mean may be taken between the enactments of the two: thus democracies require no property qualification, or only a small one, from members of the assembly, oligarchies a high one; here neither of these is the common term, but a mean between them.
- ◆ (3) There is a third mode, in which something is borrowed from the oligarchical and something from the democratical principle.
 - For example, the appointment of magistrates **by lot** is thought to be democratical,
 - and the election of them oligarchical;
 - democratical again when there is no property qualification,
 - oligarchical when there is.
- iv. (*Representative Democracy as a Feasible form of Aristocracy!*) **In the aristocratical or constitutional state, one element will be taken from each-**
 - ◆ from oligarchy the principle of electing to offices,
 - ◆ from democracy the disregard of qualification.
 - ◆ Such are the various modes of combination.
- v. (Digression: Examples of existing Greek mixed forms of constitutional government)
 - ◆ The **Lacedaemonian** constitution, for example, is often described as a democracy, because it has many democratical features.
 - In the first place the youth receive a democratical education.
 - For the sons of the poor are brought up with the sons of the rich, who are educated in such a manner as to make it possible for the sons of the poor to be educated by them.
 - A similar equality prevails in the following period of life, and when the citizens are grown up to manhood the same rule is observed;
 - there is no distinction between the rich and poor.
 - In like manner they all have the same food at their public tables, and the rich wear only such clothing as any poor man can afford.
 - Again, the people elect to one of the two greatest offices of state, and in the other they share; for they elect the Senators and share in the Ephoralty.
 - ◆ By others the **Spartan** constitution is said to be an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical elements.
 - That all offices are filled by election and none by lot, is one of these oligarchical characteristics;
 - that the power of inflicting death or banishment rests with a few persons is another; and there are others.
 - ◆ In a well attempted polity there should appear to be both elements and yet neither;

- also the government should rely on itself, and not on foreign aid,
- and on itself not through the good will of a majority-
- they might be equally well-disposed when there is a vicious form of government-
- but through the general willingness of all classes in the state to maintain the constitution.

AE. (Snippets from Book 4, part 11) We have now to inquire what is the **best constitution for most states**, and the best life for most men,

- ◆ neither assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary persons,
 - ◆ nor an education which is exceptionally favored by nature and circumstances,
 - ◆ nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only,
 - ◆ but having regard to the life in which the majority are able to share, and to the form of government which states in general can attain.
- i. *Ethics* is true, that *the happy life is the life according to virtue lived without impediment*, and that virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in **a mean attainable by every one**, must be the best. And the same the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and of constitutions; for the constitution is in a figure the life of the city.
 - ii. As to those (*hypothetical ideal*) aristocracies, as they are called, of which we were just now speaking, they either lie beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states, or they approximate to the so-called constitutional government, and therefore need no separate discussion.
 - ◆ And in fact the conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these forms rests upon the same grounds.
 - ◆ For if what was said in *the Ethics* is true, that the happy life is the life according to virtue lived without impediment, and that virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must be the best.
 - ◆ And the **same the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and of constitutions**; for the constitution is in a figure the life of the city.
 - iii. Now in all states there are three elements: one class is very rich, another very poor, and a third in a mean.
 - iv. It is admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation; for in that condition of life men are most ready to follow rational principle.
 - ◆ But he who greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth, or wealth, or on the other hand who is very poor, or very weak, or very much disgraced, finds it difficult to follow rational principle.
 - Of these two the one sort grow into violent and great criminals, the others into rogues and petty rascals.
 - And two sorts of offenses correspond to them, the one committed from violence, the other from roguery.

- ♦ Again, the middle class is least likely to shrink from rule, or to be over-ambitious for it; both of which are injuries to the state.
- Again, those who have too much of the goods of fortune, strength, wealth, friends, and the like, are neither willing nor able to submit to authority. The evil begins at home; for when they are boys, by reason of the luxury in which they are brought up, they never learn, even at school, the habit of obedience.
- On the other hand, the very poor, who are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded.
- So that the one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically; the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like slaves.
- ♦ Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this:
- for good fellowship springs from friendship; when men are at enmity with one another, they would rather not even share the same path.
- v. But a city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle classes.
- ♦ Wherefore the **city which is composed of middle-class citizens is necessarily best** constituted in respect of the elements of which we say the fabric of the state naturally consists.
- And this is the class of citizens which is most secure in a state, for they do not, like the poor, covet their neighbors' goods;
- nor do others covet theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich;
- and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves plotted against, they pass through life safely.
- Wisely then did Phocylides pray- 'Many things are best in the mean; I desire to be of a middle condition in my city.'
- vi. (*A big jump*) Thus it is manifest that **the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class**, and that those states are likely to be well-administered in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly;
- ♦ for the **addition of the middle class turns the scale**, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. (*Hint of the median voter theorem?*)
- ♦ Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property;
- ♦ for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme- either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy;
- ♦ but it is not so likely to arise out of the middle constitutions and those akin to them.
- ♦ (I will explain the reason of this hereafter, when I speak of the revolutions of states.)
- vii. (*Economic prerequisites for democracy*) The **mean condition of states is clearly best**,

- ♦ for no other is free from faction;
- ♦ and where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions.
- ♦ For a similar reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones,
- ♦ because in them the middle class is large;
- ♦ whereas in small states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave nothing in the middle.
- ♦ And democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in the government;
- ♦ for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end. A proof of the superiority of the middle class is that the best legislators have been of a middle condition; for example, Solon, as his own verses testify; and Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and Charondas, and almost all legislators.
- viii. [Book 4, Part 12] We have now to consider what and what kind of government is suitable to what and what kind of men.
- ♦ I may begin by assuming, as a general principle common to all governments, that the portion of the state which **desires the permanence of the constitution** ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse.
- ♦ Now every city is composed of quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity, superiority of numbers.
- ix. The legislator should always include the middle class in his government;
- ♦ if he makes his laws oligarchical, to the middle class let him look; if he makes them democratical, he should equally by his laws try to attach this class to the state.
- ♦ There only can the government ever be stable where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others, and in that case there will be no fear that the rich will unite with the poor against the rulers.
- ♦ For neither of them will ever be willing to serve the other, and if they look for some form of government more suitable to both, they will find none better than this, for the rich and the poor will never consent to rule in turn, because they mistrust one another.
- x. **The arbiter is always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an arbiter.**

AF. Book 4 Part XIII [*Government Deception, and Property Qualifications for Voting*]

- i. The devices by which **oligarchies deceive the people** are five in number; they relate to (1) the assembly; (2) the magistracies; (3) the courts of law; (4) the use of arms; (5) gymnastic exercises.
- ♦ (1) The assemblies are thrown open to all, but either the rich only are fined for non-attendance, or a much larger fine is inflicted upon them.
- ♦ (2) to the magistracies, those who are qualified by property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may.

- ◆ (3) In the law courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined if they do not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or, as in the laws of Charondas, a larger fine is inflicted on the rich, and a smaller one on the poor.
 - In some states all citizen who have registered themselves are allowed to attend the assembly and to try causes; but if after registration they do not attend either in the assembly or at the courts, heavy fines are imposed upon them.
 - The intention is that through fear of the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and then they cannot sit in the law-courts or in the assembly. concerning
- ◆ (4) the possession of arms, and
- ◆ (5) gymnastic exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit.
 - For the poor are not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not having them; and in like manner no penalty is inflicted on the poor for non-attendance at the gymnasium, and consequently, having nothing to fear, they do not attend, whereas the rich are liable to a fine, and therefore they take care to attend.
- ii. These are the devices of oligarchical legislators, and in **democracies they have counter devices**.
 - ◆ They pay the poor for attending the assemblies and the law-courts, and they inflict no penalty on the rich for non-attendance. It is obvious that he who would duly mix the two principles should combine the practice of both, and provide that the poor should be paid to attend, and the rich fined if they do not attend, for then all will take part; if there is no such combination, power will be in the hands of one party only.
 - ◆ The government should be confined to those who carry arms.
 - ◆ **As to the property qualification**, no absolute rule can be laid down, but we must see what is the highest qualification sufficiently comprehensive to secure that the number of those who have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those excluded. [*The Liberal aspiration of the 19th century?*]
 - ◆ Even if they have no share in office, the poor, provided only that they are not outraged or deprived of their property, will be quiet enough.
- iii. But to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy thing, since a ruling class is not always humane.
 - ◆ And in time of war the poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed; when fed, they are willing enough to fight.
 - ◆ In some states the government is vested, not only in those who are actually serving, but also in those who have served; among the Malians, for example, the governing body consisted of the latter, while the magistrates were chosen from those actually on service.
 - ◆ And the **earliest government which existed among the Hellenes**, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry; indeed, without discipline, infantry are useless, and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay in their cavalry).

- ◆ But **when cities increased** and the heavy armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government; and this is the reason why the states which we call constitutional governments have been hitherto called democracies.
- ◆ **Ancient constitutions**, as might be expected, were oligarchical and royal; their population being small they had no considerable middle class; the people were weak in numbers and organization, and were therefore more contented to be governed. [*Shades of Medieval Europe*]

IV. Thought Questions

- A.** What differences did you notice between the way in which Plato (Socrates) and Aristotle approached the task of designing an ideal constitution?
- i. What issues did they consider that modern theorists continue to study and evaluate?
 - ii. What issues did they consider that modern rational choice theorists have neglected, perhaps improperly so?
 - iii. Did either, or both, Plato or Aristotle use models in their analyses? Describe them?
 - iv. Did you notice the utilitarian and contractarian roots of their analyses of constitutions?
- B.** What essential property does an ideal constitution have under their two theories?
- i. Who should be a citizen?
 - ii. Who should rule?
 - iii. What collective choice procedure should be adopted.
 - iv. Is this an elite or non-elite government?
 - v. How are women treated?
 - vi. What obligations does the state have for education?
 - vii. What obligations does the state have for dealing with poverty?
- C.** In what way, if any, could Aristotle's approach be termed more scientific than Plato's?
- D.** In what way, if any, would a medieval European king be more pleased to hear Plato's theory than Aristotle's?
- E.** Which line of argument seems to be "most modern?"
- i. Is Plato's system totalitarian?
 - ii. Is Aristotle's conception of women different than Plato's?
 - iii. Do either of them believe in "popular sovereignty?"
 - iv. Do either of them regard the ideal state to be the result of a social contract?
 - v. Are either theory "utilitarian" in its foundation?
- F.** What errors did you notice in their arguments?

G. Why did political science disappear for more than a thousand years? Or did it really disappear?