Perfecting Parliament:
the Peaceful Path to
of Parliamentary Democracy

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This book is dedicated to my teachers, colleagues, family, and friends, without whose support and thoughtful criticism over many years, the present volume could never have been written.

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Chapter 1: The Design and Evolution of Parliament

1. Introduction: A Revolutionary Century

Two political revolutions occurred gradually in Northern Europe during the nineteenth century and first part of the twentieth century. First, there was a shift of political authority from kings to parliaments. Second, parliaments became more broadly grounded in popular suffrage. This century-long shift in the locus of political power was a major event, although the individual shifts of power and expansions of suffrage were often, themselves, relatively small events. Nor were these two shifts of policymaking power entirely connected. For example, European parliaments had occasionally gained power in previous periods without a broadening of their electoral base, which prior to the 1800 were generally limited to well-organized elites. In some cases suffrage expanded more rapidly than power shifted to the parliament, as in Germany, while in others parliament became the dominant institution for public policy making well before universal suffrage was obtained, as in England. Yet, the democratic parliaments of 1920 were broadly similar throughout Europe, and were radically different from the previous governments that Europe and the world had known in all recorded history. These new parliamentary governments were revolutionary, although not products of war nor sudden breaks with the past.

Evidently, something new happened in the nineteenth-century Europe that gave rise to revolutionary changes in governance in the course of a century or so. It has often been suggested that industrialization played a role in these amazing and often largely peaceful reforms. However, to the best of my knowledge, no one has provided a peaceful mechanism through which industrialization, which is itself largely an economic activity, may induce major political reforms.

Moreover, whether economic development may induce constitutional reform or constitutional reform induces industrialization is not obvious. After all, it is political decisions that define formal property rights and liability laws, and political decisions that largely determine how those rights and obligations will be enforced. Such political decisions, along with technological advance, clearly have large effects on a nation's path of economic development by affecting market size, transactions costs, and the rate of technological innovation. Indeed, one could argue that national politics largely determines market activity, even in a fairly complete model of political economy. However, it also seems clear that causality is not unidirectional from the political sphere to the economic one. There is clearly an interdependence between economic and political activities in the small, as when individual pieces of legislation or administrative rulings are influenced by the testimony and lobbying efforts of organized economic interests. The present analysis suggests that this may also be true in the large, insofar as major constitutional reforms may be induced by politically active groups whose economic interests are advanced by such reforms. In this manner, technological progress may create new opportunities and new pressures for constitutional reform by inducing new forms of economic organization.

Overall, the analysis developed in this book suggests that the road to democracy is not produced by industrialization alone, but also requires the support of politically active groups with an interest in more liberal forms of political decisionmaking. The usefulness of the analysis is supported by the experience of the Northern European kingdoms in the nineteenth century, although the analysis is not limited to that experience, insofar as parliamentary political structures have been widely used outside nineteenth century Europe, and Japanese governance went through a very similar transformation at the beginning of the twentieth century. The analysis is relevant for any country in which the control of suffrage laws--the rules that determine which citizens participate in national elections--is initially vested in a subset of the citizenry based largely on wealth, and in which unrealized opportunities for constitutional exchange exist.

This book uses the rational choice methodology to analyze alternative methods through which industrialization may directly or indirect institutional and suffrage reform. The analysis suggests that the “rise of parliament” did not arise because of changes in the income or wealth of those originally represented in parliament. Industrialization may increase the cost of governance in a manner that increases the importance of tax instruments controlled by parliaments, which allowed the parliament to trade taxes for additional control over public policy. Similarly, industrialization may have provided additional support for liberal arguments favoring more open markets and more open politics. Such changes in the ideology of those initially represented in parliament can lead to a gradual increased suffrage. Such ideological shifts may also

have played a role in the transfer of power from the king to the parliament, by reducing other ideological sources of support for royal control of public policy.

Overall, however, the link between industrialization and parliamentary democracy is indirect. The historical veto power of parliaments over new taxes provided a method for constitutional exchange as the cost of government (wars and palaces) increased with technological change. The connection between political and economic liberalism was strong in this period--although as Hardin (xxxx) points out it is not an entirely necessary connection. The analysis suggests that industrialization in the 19th century led to suffrage reform in large part because it empowered new ideological and economic interest groups that shared interests in both increasing Parliament's control over public policy and in suffrage reform. This was reinforced by the success of many of the economic reforms which changed both the level and distribution of wealth within the industrializing societies, and also allowed both more time and more wealth to be devoted to liberal political activities by individuals and groups at the margins of the existing political institutions.

2. Evolutionary rather than Revolutionary Reform

There is a sense in which all contemporary constitutional democracies can be regarded as revolutionary forms of government, as totally new forms of governance. Prior to 1700, there were no large scale democracies and very few city sized democracies with broad suffrage are found in historical records. Only citizens, narrowly defined, could vote in Athens. Only the wealthiest voted in mediveal cities such as Sienna and Florence during their "democratic" periods. However, the shift to democratic governance was not sudden, nor did it require a radical break with older institutions. Rather, new systems of governance gradually emerged the late eighteenth century and nineteenth centuries as long-standing political institutions were revised a little at a time. Such changes had happened before, but this time there was a trend to the changes rather than a random series of reforms and counter reforms.

In the end, there was a completely new assignments of policy making power and a completely new method of choosing parliaments. Both these changes were grounded in relatively new theories of legitimate power—theories rooted in popular sovereignty, broad suffrage, and the rule of law, rather than military power, theology, or family trees. However, these theories were, except in what became the United States, more than a century older than the period of maximal political and economic reform. Locke, Montesquei, Rouseau, Paine, Smith, and Madison wrote in the 17th and 18th centuries rather than the 19th century. Thus, although their thoughtful words and arguments--as well as 19th century restatements and extensions of them--played an important role in debates over institutional reform within parliament and within literate society, they were not themselves the proximate cause of institutional reform in the 19th century.

Nor were institutional reforms the result of great new organized efforts on the part of the uninfranchised, what Marxists refer to as the masses. Outside of France, there were not significant armed conflicts or civil wars associated with institutional reform. Nor, were the French civil wars very successful at creating durable democratic parliamentary systems. The first effort yielded Napolean, and the second Napolean III, both authoritarian regimes rather than parliamentary democracies.

Evidence of the gradual emergence of democratic parliamentary forms is evident in the basic structure of contemporary governance, which clearly owes much to earlier undemocratic forms. There is generally an executive branch headed by a single person and a parliament or legislature organized more or less as a large committee. This general architecture might in early societies might have been called a "chief and a council of wise men" or in medieval times a "king and royal council" or "king and parliament." By sharing this essential architecture, modern parliamentary governments reveal their deep historical roots. On the other hand, it is clear that modern democratic forms place greater power in their councils (legislatures) than their medieval and ancient precursors ever did.

This is not to say that parliaments were uniformly weak in earlier times, nor that kings (or queens) were always the dominant branch of government prior to 1800. England and Sweden both had relatively strong parliaments in the eighteenth century. The Netherlands had been a republic in the previous two centuries with an even stronger parliament and a relatively weak executive, their Stadhouder. The United States had formed a new government late in the eighteenth century based on elections, with an elected executive rather than an inherited one. But, with the possible exception of the United States, in no case was broad-based suffrage used to select members of their "representative assemblies." And in no case could the rise of parliament in previous century be considered a new durable form of government, rather than a temporary shift of power from one branch to the other.

For example, eighteenth century Netherlands had seen the rise of executive power as the office of Stadhouder became an increasingly regal post. In the last few decades of the eighteenth century, George III began reclaiming powers from the British parliament before overtaken with health problems. The “age of liberty in Sweden” was overthrown by Gustav III. Even the French revolution came to naught as Napolean's empire replaced the Republic, and subsequently a dominant crown was restored in the aftermath of the Napoleanic wars by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The long run equilibrium of king dominated parliamentary systems seemed more or less as safe and sound as ever in 1815.

Yet in just one century, these durable king dominated systems of governance were nearly all gone in Europe. By 1920, the balance of power within most European governments had radically reformed. Parliaments rose in legislative and fiscal authority, and its members were largely chosen by broad electorates. The old suffrage laws based on birth, status, or wealth were replaced by other increasingly inclusive laws that eventually include essentially all adult men and women. These radical changes, however, occurred within a more or less stable architecture of governance.

3. Focus, Framework, and Contribution of the Book

The purpose of the present study is to provide an explanation for both the revolutionary and evolutionary features of that very important revolution in governance. It attempts to do so using a blend of rational choice theory, history, and statistical analysis. The analysis and evidence developed provide considerable support for the hypothesis that constitutional negotiation and exchange account for the main outlines of modern constitutional design and for the modern assignment of powers between branches of government.

The present work, thus, provides an alternative to the widely held revolution and revolutionary threat based theories of democratic reform that a good deal of theoretical and historical accounts rely upon, from Marx (1959) to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). The analysis does not deny that civil war can at least conceptually be used to change the form of a nation’s governance. However, the analysis suggests that civil war is unnecessary for great reforms to emerge, and, moreover, unlikely to be a mechanism for achieving democratic reform. There are very few examples of civil wars or wars of succession that generated democracies in cases where the prerevolutionary institutions were not already substantially democratic or were largely ineffective. Wars require hierarchical organization, which tends to lend itself to post-revolution dictatorship rather than democracy. Here one can recall the results of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions which empowered Napoleon, Lenin, and Mao rather than democratic reformers or “the people.”

In most cases, successful democratic transitions have been evolutionary developments rather than revolutionary; both the sense that no open warfare occurred and no radical break with past institutions was necessary.

The emphasis on revolution and revolutionary threats in many accounts is partly a consequence of placing too much emphasis on pure forms of government. This tends to focus attention on constitutional choices between dictatorship and democracy. There are no intermediate steps possible in such a discrete representation of constitutions, and thus revolution is necessary to jump the chasm between dictatorship and democracy. However, such accounts neglect the intermediate cases of political organization, cases which in fact are far more common than the extremes. If only pure dictatorships and democracies exist, a change in institutions would clearly require a great leap rather than a series of relatively small steps..

Most governments in practice, however, include both a “king” and a “council,” that is to say a branch of government headed by a single chief executive and another composed of a committee of more or less “equals” who make decisions by counting votes. In dictatorships, the executive has most of the policy making and appointment authority, and the council serves for the most part an advisory role. In such cases, the council makes recommendations to the "ruler" rather than rules. In constitutional democracies the council makes the rules and the executive simply implements them. In intermediate forms of the king and council architecture, the power to make decisions that direct governmental resources to particular courses of action are distributed in a variety of ways. For example, each branches of government may have exclusive power in different areas of policy. The "king" may decide international relations and the "council" may decide domestic policies. Or, power over all policies may be shared in a number of ways as with mutual veto power, agenda setting, or appointment power.

This continuum allows the possibility of wide range of governmental types, and also allows the possibility that power may be peacefully shifted from one branch of government to the other. The multidimensional nature of policymaking authority also implies that political power is not always a zero sum game. The existence of an internal

"market for power" potentially allows parliamentary democracy to emerge gradually as appointment and legislative powers are “traded” between the principal chambers of governance.

4. The Organization of the Book

The work of the book is divided into three parts. All three parts are necessary to develop the argument at an appropriate depth. Some readers will find some parts to be of greater interest than others, others will find the depth sufficiently deep for their tastes or interests. For these, I suggest that the effort to connect the theoretical dots and the historical dots is at least as much of interests as a microscopic examination of the dots themselves.

Part I: An Evolutionary Theory of Constitutional Design

The first part of the book develops an analytical history in the tradition of modern rational choice based economic and political science. This basic technique, of course, has long been used by political theorists. Many of these earlier efforts are very famous and include Aristotle’s (xxxx) discussion of the emergence of society in the *Politics,* Hobbes' (1651) use of life under anarchy as a defense of political and legal institutions required to avoid such poor and nasty lives. Olson's (xxxx) analysis of roving and stationary bandits which demonstrates that dictators may have an encompassing interest in the economic development of their communities. Analytical histories allow essential features of a choice setting to be understood in an ceteris paribus environment that abstracts from many of the details of people and place.

The analytical history developed below analyzes the emergence of government as one of many organizations used by all societies to advance ends which are more easily accomplished by teams than disorganized groups of individuals. It focuses attention on the formation of organizations, their internal incentive structures, and especially their decision making procedures. It suggests that the “king and council” has many advantages as a form of organizational governance. Thus, it will tend be adopted by all sorts of organizations including an organization of particular interest for the purposes of this book, namely government. It explains why governments tend to be organizations that have monopoly power over some services and why such monopoly power tends to allow it to use coercive methods to impose and enforce its rules.

Given the emergence of governments and the advantages of the "king and council template," the distribution of decisionmaking authority within that template is clearly of interest for the purposes of this book. Of particular interest are intra governmental exchanges—constitutional exchanges—that change the assignment of authority to commit organizational resources to new tasks. In economic terms, the power to legislate and select members of the organization are "resources" that can be traded for other goods and services of interest to those with the power to change the rules. In fortuitous circumstances, the analysis demonstrates that a series of constitutional exchanges can lead to parliamentary rule and to democratic selection of the members of parliament.

The analytical results suggest that opportunities for constitutional exchange tend to emerge when there is a substantial shift in the interests or wealth of the those with the power to make such reforms. Modifications of a country's fiscal constitution in exchange for greater legislative authority can change the process of legislation and the balance of power within governance. That is to say it may change an organization's constitution.

Part II: Historical Narratives

Testing the usefulness of the analytical models is the focus of part three of the book, which is the main body of the present work. An analytical model can be tested in a variety of ways, the most common in mainstream social science is through statistical tests using aggregate data of various kinds. Another older method widely used in the physical sciences it to examine the record to see whether the predictions of the theory are borne out in the historical record. To say that a theory is tested by its predictions is not to say that only predictions about the future can be used as tests. Were this so, we would know very little for example about geology, biological evolution, or astronomy.

The first chapter of the historical section of the book shows that constitutional developments in most of Europe and in Japan are broadly consistent with the models of constitutional exchange within king and council governments and ideologically driven suffrage reform. That is to say, in Northern Europe, Italy, and Japan parliament’s veto power was used in both explicit and implicit exchanges for new authority to control public policy. And in most of these cases, a broad range of newly organized economic and ideological interest groups lobbied for both economic and political reforms. These groups often had overlapping memberships and often included

support from those allowed to vote under existing suffrage laws. As norms about who was and who was not qualified to vote changed through the 19th century, suffrage law, with minor eceptions, gradually became more and more inclusive. By 1925, essentially all men and all women were allowed to cast secret ballots in national elections that determined the memberships of parliaments with more or less complete control over public policy.

This general overview of nineteenth century developments in Europe is buttressed by more focused historical narratives that focus on historical developments in several countries. The first three are "easy cases" in which all the elements of the model are in evidence: the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The next three cases are more difficult ones in which some elements are missing, although the essential political and economic reforms are clearly evident: Denmark, Germany, and Japan. Similar chapters could easily be written on Belgium, Norway, Italy, and with a bit more difficulty for France, Spain, and the United States, but the six cases are sufficient to demonstrate that the predictions of the model developed can account for important elements of the European path to democracy in the 19th century.

Although the case histories studied are for the most part European ones, it seems clear that similar narratives for North and South America and other parts of the world can be developed. All that the basic theory requires is an institutional setting allow the possibility of constitutional exchange and persuasive campaigns to be undertaken. The former requires a nontrivial division of power between two or more centers of policy making and the opportunity for groups to form and legally lobby government for policy reform. Such conditions are not universal, but clearly exist in non-European settings as well.

Many excellent historians, in my view, over use the term revolutionary when discussing constitutional changes in the 19th century, as for example true of Palmer (xxxx), where they often point to significant changes adopted through more or less conventional procedures, rather than new laws imposed by the victors of violent civil wars (which often impose more or less traditional authoritarian regimes rather than radical new democratic ones).

Part III: Conclusions and Remaining Issues

If the choice settings analyzed are truly representative of those confronting real organizations, then the predicted institutional choices should be commonplace in real histories. The second part of the book develops a series of historical narratives that explore the histories of real kings and their councils (parliaments). Of particular interest are the constitutional reforms of the nineteenth century that changed many of these long standing king dominate systems into parliamentary democracies. The industrial revolution may explain why the great democratic reforms of 19th century Europe were undertaken in that century rather than in former times. On the other hand, the particular mechanisms identified, also explains why only the countries that democratized underwent industrialization.

It bears noting that the "tests of representativeness" undertaken in the historical part of the book differ from those of mainstream econometric work in which a particular model is assumed to be universal, and statistical inference is undertaken on the assumption that whatever is "unexplained" is random, a pure chance event. It also differs from the a common approach among historians in which causal connections between events are induced (or created by clever narrators) that make particular sequences of events appear to be inevitable. The claim of the book is not universality nor inevitability, but rather that a particular class of governance problems is sufficiently commonplace that their solutions are also commonplace, and thus easily observed features of the world.

Historical and statistical evidence, from this perspective, provide evidence of the representativeness of the choice settings focused on rather than universality or inevitability. A very small "error term" would not mean that no other explanation exists, nor would a very large "error term" imply that a faulty analysis has been undertaken, only that the present one is more or less broadly applicable. Fortunately for the purposes of this book, the models developed account for the timing and nature of many important historical events, which suggests that the choice settings analyzed are in fact very common within governments of relatively large polities.

5. Methodological Foundations of the Book: Constitutional Political Economy

Although this book include a good deal of history and reflects many years of work spent studying books by careful historians. This book is not intended to be a historical work, but rather a contribution to social science. That is to say, it attempts to develop and test a particular theory of constitutional reform, rather than to induce patterns from history itself. This is not because I believe that induction is impossible,

but rather because it is difficult to develop general theories based on induction. Every event and every person includes unique aspects, which ultimately determines what transpires. For a historian, identifying what is unique is at least as important as identifying what is general, and enormous time an attention is devoted by historians to studying particular events in history, especially unusual ones. Such unique events are nearly without interest for the present enterprise. The general features and more or less universal determinants of political institutions are the sole focus on the present research project.

Rational choice models help identify essential determinants of individua l choices. They do so, in part, because the models are so difficult to construct and because they are subjected to a variety of methodological norms. A rational choice model should minimize the factors taken into account, which tends to focus attention on "important" factors. A model should be logically consistent, which eliminates many intuitively plausible representations of relationships between people, markets, and political factors. A rational choice model should rely as much as possible on narrow self interest as an explanatory factor, not because such interests are always dominate, but because they are essentially universal and thus likely to influence the decisions of all perons--at least at the margin. And, lastly, models should be consistent with earlier models and existing statistical research on the topics of interest. Such methodological norms have provided considerable insight into the operation of ordinary economic markets and day to day politics--although the models, as models, are necessarily incomplete in the sense that they ignore ideosyncratic factors that are often important in particular decisions by consumers, firms, voters, and politicians.

Narrow special cases are generally of little interest for rational choice model builders. Every person and every setting includes unique factors, but these "unsystematic factors" remain in the error term, which is often quite large, for purposes of analysis.

The rational choice approach allows the properties of governments to be analyzed in an "other things being equal" framework, which is impossible in historical work. This allows theorists to determine who particular features of a given political system affect policy choices. Perhaps the best known of these are the various median voter theorems for democratic governance. A broad cross section of rational choice models imply that majority rule tends to favor policies that are preferred by moderate rather than extreme voters, in pure cases those of the median voter (Black, 1948, Besley and Coate, 1997, Congleton xxxx). Analysis of constitutional designs using rational choice models began in 1962 with the publication of the *Calculus of Consent* by Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, which used models of individual interests to assess the properties of a fairly broad range of constitutional alternatives.

Political institutions matter because they determine who participates in the determination of public policies, how those individuals are selected for that responsibility, and the process through which policy decisions are made. They often include other constraints on what types of policies have to be made and what kinds of policies cannot. For example, election law determine who gets to vote and how the votes will be counted. Together with "turnout," these determine the identity of the median voter and thereby the policies most likely to be adopted. Parliamentary structure; bicameralism or unicameral legislature, decentralized or centralized political authority; presidential, prime ministerial, or royal executive, affect which members of government exercise decisive power over public policies. The policy choices affect behavior and outcomes by those outside government as markets flourish or decline, dissent or support increases, and as rates of innovation change the range of technologies available for organizing economic, political, and cultural life.

The Constitutional Political Economy Literature

The modern analytical literature on constitutional design includes hundreds of academic papers that attempt to determine the interdependence between features of governance and public policy. For example, there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of federalism. See, for example, Riker (1962), Ferejohn and Weingast (1997), or Mueller (2003). Excellent surveys of the theoretical literature and empirical are provided by Mueller (1996), Cooter (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2003), and Congleton and Swedenborg (2006).

However, the gradual process through which the general architecture of governance comes in to existence has attracted relatively little interest. Political constitutions are by definition and necessity a durable, stable, legal setting in which ordinary day-to-day and year-to-year public and private decisions are made. And, a constitution must be taken as given for purposes of ordinary legislation if it is to serve as rules of the game. Otherwise, conflict over decisionmaking procedures would dominate, and governments would be little more than disorganized debating societies.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that stable decision making rules and constraints are in place when analyzing the kinds of policies that a particular polity is likely to adopt.

However, constitutions have to be completely stable and durable to serve as effective "rules of the game," but can and are routinely revised in minor ways that do not radically transform the game. The more closely one examines a constitutional framework, the more evident are the nearly continuous efforts to advance and oppose reforms of existing procedures and constraints. And many changes are adopted, although many of these reforms will pass unnoticed to those outside government. However, as demonstrated below, in some cases a series of minor constitutional reforms can have important effects on the fundamental procedures and constraints of governance.

The King and Council Model

The constitutions focused on in this book are all bipolar governments based on the "king and council" template, a model of government that I developed several years ago. The king and council system of governance is not a single form of government, but rather a menu of binary governments from which a broad range of particular constitutional procedures and constraints can be contrived. For example, the king and council template includes king dominated systems with advisory councils, constitutional monarchies, and modern parliamentary systems with a largely symbolic royal sovereign. Such bipolar governments have long been used to make public policies, but modern versions of these governments operate in a manner quite different from the old medieval systems they are based upon.

In part the variation in procedures and constrains reflects differences in the personalities, talents, and interests of the particular persons populating particular executive (king) and legislative (council) positions at different times and places. However, the variations also reflect minor and major differences in the formal decision processes used within such systems to select and implement policies. This constitutional flexibility allows the "king and council" template to be tailored to advance the interests of policy makers and their supporters as circumstances and interests change through time. Yet, as true of both suits of armor and formal attire, because adjustments do not give either the king or parliament complete freedom of action. Rather, each particular assignment of policy making authority within the king and council template has affects on the possibilities available to those in government at a particular time and place.

The flexibility of such systems in the long run, however, plays an important role in peaceful transitions from king dominated systems to parliamentary democracy. The present analysis suggests that cumulative revisions of assignment of policy making authority during the past two or three centuries have generated essentially new forms of government. And, it seems clear that the "new parliaments" are major improvements from the perspective of those governed. Physical standards of living have generally improved, fear of arbitrary punishment has diminished, and a broader array of desired public services have become available. In this sense, it could be said that parliamentary governance has been perfected as a method of policy making, at least within the developed countries of the world. In this sense, parliament can be said to have been perfected by these changes.

The main aim of the book, however, is positive rather than normative. It attempts to characterize peaceful processes of constitutional reform, to explain why such processes were common in the nineteenth century, but not before, and why they had systematic effects on parliamentary institutions.

The interdependence between political and economic development identified in the theoretical part of the book are clearly important. Only the countries in which parliaments became liberal democracies industrialized . And, only countries that industrialized became democracies. In nineteenth century Europe, the economic and political liberalization went hand and hand. In the nineteenth century, the policy changes necessary for both transitions to occur were supported by many of the same politically active individuals, interest groups, and political parties.

This suggests, in contrast to many contemporary theories of the far right and far left, that economic and democratic development and democracy are complements rather than rivals-- at least in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Whether this remains true for contemporary transitions, remains open to debate. But the present analysis suggests that the spread of liberal economic and political ideas, especially within political elites, can produce a combination of economic and political reforms that gradually transforms a more or less stagnant medieval society into more attractive democratic and market-based societies.

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This book is generalizes and deepens my previous book on the Swedish constitutional reform. That earlier research was supported as part of the constitutional project at the Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle (SNS). Although, it was not immediately obvious, Sweden illustrates the possibility that king-dominated systems of governments can peacefully transform themselves into modern democratic parliamentary systems. By being a bit out of the mainstream tides of Europe, Sweden avoided the great colonial impulse of continental states and also the last two centuries of international wars which generated various domestic political tensions and crises for those participating in them. Sweden, however, did not avoid the internal pressures for reform of parliament that are associated with industrialization.

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