|
Recent
and Forthcoming Publications |
| 105 |
Constitutional Political Economy
and the Nature and the Effects of Rights. |
Kyklos
(2026) 79: 273-84.
DOI: 10.1111/kykl.70030 |
| 104 |
Rent Seeking in a Constitutional
Context: Linkages and Constraints. |
Constitutional
Political Economy
(2026) 37:149-172
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09460-1.
|
| 103 |
The Median Voter Model, |
Encyclopedia
of Public Choice (C. Bjornskov and J. A. Pin, Eds)
(2025, Edward Elgar, Chapter 62: 433-40.) |
| 102 |
Public Choice and Good Governance, |
Encyclopedia
of Public Choice (C. Bjornskov and J. A. Pin, Eds)
(2025, Edward Elgar, Chapter 91: 550-57) |
| 101 |
Optimal Taxation for Democracies
with Less than Perfect Voters: A Public Choice
Perspective. |
Kyklos
(2024) 77: 3-21. [open access]
DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12356 |
| 100 |
Grounding Multidisciplinary
Public Policy Analysis in Methodological
Individualism:With an Illustrating Study of the Economic
and Political Effects of Variations in a Nation’s
Average Work Ethic. |
International
Journal of Economic Policy Studies (2023) 17:
351-83
DOI: 10.1007/s42495-023-00109-9). |
| 99 |
Federalism and Tax-Financed
Healthcare, Economic Advantages, Dilemmas and Solutions, |
Handbook
of the Political Economy of Healthcare Systems (J
Costa-Font, Turati, G., and A. Batinti, Eds) Edward
Elgar (2023): 57-69. |
| 98 |
Federalism and Pandemic Policies:
Variety Is the Spice of Life. |
Public
Choice (2023) 195: 73-100
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00915-9.
|
|
Basic
Properties of a Simplified Oxford Model of Covid
Transmission: Simulations, Conclusions, and
Comments on the Corona Virus (An Excel File, updated
May 2021, can be reparameterized by downloading it).
|
|
|
Recently
Published (2016-22) |
| 97 |
Book. Solving Social Dilemmas:
Ethics, Politics, and Prosperity. Oxford
University Press (460 pages, 2022). |
(Prepublication Preface). Link
to Tridimas Review
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09397-x, Munger Review, Haliday Review (EC and Phil),
Geloso Review (econlib)
|
| 96 |
Behavioral Economics and the
Virginia School of Political Economy: Overlaps and
Complementarities. |
Public
Choice
(2022) 191: 387-404
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00679-3. |
| 95 |
Readership and Citations as
Alternative Measures of Impact (with A. Marsella and
A. J. Cardazzi) |
Constitutional
Political Economy (2022) 33: 100-14
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09333-x. |
| 94 |
Ethics and Good Governance, |
Public
Choice (2020) 184: 379-98
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00824-3. |
| 93 |
Governance by True Believers:
Supreme Duties with and without Totalitarianism, |
Constitutional
Political Economy (2020) 31(1): 111-141.
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09300-y |
| 92 |
The Institutions of International
Treaty Organizations as Evidence for Social Contract
Theory, |
European
Journal of Political Economy (2020) 63: 101891.
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101891 |
| 91 |
On the Stability of U.S.
Politics: Post-Sample Forecasts and Refinements of the
Congleton-Shughart Models of Social Security and
Medicare Benefit Levels. (with Y. Kim and A.
Marsella) |
Public
Choice (2020) 183: 101-132.
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00689-1 |
| 90 |
Fiscal Bargaining and the
Implicit Fiscal Constitutions of Liberal Democracies: A
Public Choice Perspective, |
Public Policy Review (2019) 15
(2): 175-198.
|
| 89 |
Toward a Rule-Based Model of
Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo
Constitutionalus, in R. E. Wagner (Ed.) |
James
M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and
Social Philosophy. Volume III
of the series
Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.(2019): 769-805
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_34. |
| 88 |
On the Emergence of a Classic
Work: A Short History of the Impact of Gordon Tullock’s
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, |
Public
Choice
(2019) 181 (1): 5-12
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0542-4. |
| 87 |
On the
Evolution of Organizational Governance, |
in
Understanding Economic Change: Advances in
Evolutionary Economics (U. Witt ed), Cambridge
University Press (2019): 258-287. |
| 86 |
A Test of the
Institutionally-Induced Equilibrium Hypothesis: On the
Limited Fiscal Impact of Two Celebrity Governors,
(with Y. Zhou) |
Economics
of Governance (2019) 20(2): 103-128
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0218-z. |
| 85 |
On the Political Economy of
Privacy in Communities that Include both Friends and
Foes, |
Journal
of Public Finance and Public Choice (2018)
33: 127-44. |
| 84 |
Book: The Oxford Handbook of
Public Choice, Volume 1 (Co-edited with B. N.
Grofman & S. Voigt) |
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019).
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.001.0001 |
| 83 |
Book: The Oxford Handbook of
Public Choice, Volume 2 (Co-edited with B. N.
Grofman & S. Voigt) |
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019).
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.001.0001 |
| 82 |
Rational
Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research
Program and Methodology of Public Choice |
in The Oxford Handbook of Public
Choice, Volume 1 (R. D. Congleton, B. N. Grofman,
& S. Voigt, Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press
(2019), Ch. 1.
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.1 [page numbers
not independently confirmed — please verify] |
| 81 |
The
Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction |
in The Oxford Handbook of Public
Choice, Volume 1 (R. D. Congleton, B. N. Grofman,
& S. Voigt, Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press
(2019), Ch. 27. [DOI and page numbers not independently
confirmed — please verify] |
| 80 |
On the Codetermination of
Tax-Financed Medical R&D and Healthcare
Expenditures: Models and Evidence, (with A. Batinti) |
European
Journal of Political Economy (2018) 54: 175-88.
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.03.006 |
| 79 |
Buchanan
on
Ethics and Self-Interest in Politics: A Contradiction
or Reconciliation?, |
in:
Buchanan’s Tensions: Reexamining the Political
Economy and Philosophy of James M. Buchanan,
eds. Peter J. Boettke and Solomon Stein. Arlington, VA:
Mercatus Center at George Mason University (2018). |
| 78 |
Intellectual
Foundations of Public Choice, the Forest from the Trees, |
Public
Choice (2018) 175: 229-44
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0545-1. |
| 77 |
Parliaments as
Governmental Institutions, |
Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2018).
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.582 |
| 76 |
A Short History of Constitutional
Liberalism in America, |
Constitutional
Political Economy (2018) 29: 137-170
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9257-2. |
| 75 |
Constitutional
Bargaining
and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A
Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis ( with D.
W. Yoo) |
Journal
of Institutional Economics (2018) 14: 233-58.
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137417000224 |
| 74 |
The
Electoral Politics and Evolution of Complex Healthcare
Systems. (with A. Batinti and R. Pietrantonio), |
Kyklos
(2017) 70 (4): 483-510.
DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12146 |
| 73 |
Robert
Tollison and the Economics of Politics, |
Public
Choice (2017) 171: 23-28
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0422-3. |
| 72 |
Gordon
Tullock’s Implicit Analytical History of Government, |
Constitutional
Political Economy (2016) 27: 179-193
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9213-y. |
|
Other
Publications while at WVU (2011-15) |
| 71 |
The
Logic of Collective Action and Beyond, |
Public
Choice (2015) 164: 217-34
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0266-7. |
| 70 |
Japanese Translation of |
Perfecting
Parliament. A Yokayama, H. Kato and
colleagues. Tokyo Keiso Shobo. ISBN978-4-326-50416-9 Fall
2015). |
| 69 |
Thanks to
Gordon Tullock, |
Public
Choice (2015) 162:229-33
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0231-5. |
| 68 |
Book: Companion
to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
(Edited with A. L. Hillman) Edward Elgar (2015). |
[Front
Matter/Preface.] |
| 67 |
Asymmetric
Federalism:
Constitutional and Fiscal Exchange, and the Political
Economy of Decentralization, in Ahmad, S. E. and
Brosio, G. |
Handbook for Multilevel
Finance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2015,
Ch. 6).
|
| 66 |
The
Nature of Rent Seeking, |
in
A Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking.
(Edited, with A. Hillman) London: Edward Elgar Press.
(2015, ch. 1). |
| 65 |
Risk,
Uncertainty, and Constitutional Design, |
Behind a Veil of Ignorance? Power and
Uncertainty in Constitutional Design. L. M. Imbeau
and S. Jacob (eds) Edward Elgar (2015, Forward). |
| 64 |
Rent
Seeking
and Organizational Governance:Limiting Losses from
Intra-Organizational Conflict, |
Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
(Edited with A. L. Hillman) Edward Elgar (2015, ch.27). |
| 63 |
The
Contractarian
Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan. |
Constitutional
Political Economy (2014) 25: 39-67
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-013-9151-x. |
| 62 |
Coercion,
Taxation,
and Voluntary Association, |
in
Coercion and Social
Welfare in Public Finance, S. Winer (ed.)
Cambridge University Press (2014): Ch. 4. |
| 61 |
On
the Inevitability of Divided Government and
Improbability of a Complete Separation of Powers. |
Constitutional Political
Economy (2013) 24: 177-98
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-013-9143-x. |
| 60 |
On Some
Neglected, But Profound, Contributions of Gordon Tullock,
in D. Lee (ed.) |
The
Origins of Public Choice: The Legacy of Buchanan and
Tullock. Heidelberg: Springer (2013, ch.
3). |
| 59 |
Is
It All about Competence? The Human Capital of U.S.
Presidents and Economic Performance. (with Yongjing
Zhang) |
Constitutional Political
Economy (2013) 24: 108-24
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-013-9138-7.
|
| 58 |
Public
Choice and the Modern Welfare State, (with A.
Batinti, F. Bose, Y. Kim, and R. Pietrantonio) in
Shughart, W. F., L. Razzolini and M. Reksulak (Eds) Elgar Companion
to Public Choice, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar. |
(2013, ch. 22).
|
| 57 |
Early
Spanish Liberalism and the Constitutional Political
Economy, the Cadiz Constitution of 1812, |
in
Cabrillo, F, and Puchades-Navarro M. A. (Eds)
Constitutional
Economics and Public Institutions, Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing (2013, Ch. 4). |
| 56 |
Growing
up with the Calculus of Consent, |
Public Choice 152
(2012): 273-78
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9967-3. |
| 55 |
On
the
Political Economy and Limits of Crisis Insurance: the
Case of the2008–11
Bailouts. |
Public Choice 150
(2012): 399-423
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9902-z. |
| 54 |
The
Constitutional Political Economy of Gordon Tullock, |
Public Choice 152
(2012): 131-46
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9854-3. |
| 53 |
Rent
Extraction,
Liberalism, and Economic Development, |
in
Institutions and
National Competitiveness. (Y. B. Choi Ed.).
London: Routledge (2011, ch. 4). |
| 52 |
Why
Local
Governments Do Not Maximize Profits: On the Value
Added by the Representative Institutions of Town and
City Governance, |
Public Choice 149
(2011): 187-207.
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9835-6 |
| 51 |
Book.Perfecting Parliament:
Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the Rise of Western
Democracy (Cambridge University Press
2011). |
[Link
to
introduction] [Blurb and book at Amazon]
[Link to Tridimas
Review
in EJPE] [Link
to Strom Review in PoP] |
|
Other
Fairly Recent Publications
(Published while at GMU: 2000-2010) |
| 50 |
The Rise of
the Modern Welfare State, Ideology, Institutions, and
Income Security: Analysis and Evidence, (with F.
Bose) |
Public Choice 144
(2010): 535-55
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9673-y. |
| 49 |
The Political Economy of the Financial
Crisis of 2008, |
Lessons from the Financial
Crisis (R. W. Kolb, Ed.) New York: Wiley
and Sons Inc. (2010, pp. 23-9). |
| 48 |
Efficient
Mercantilism? Revenue-Maximizing Monopolization Policies
as Ramsey Taxation (with Sanghack Lee) |
European Journal of
Political Economy 25 (2009): 102-14.
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.001 |
| 47 |
On
the
Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of
2008-09. |
Public Choice 140
(2009): 287-317
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9478-z. |
| 46 |
On
the
Distributional Effects of Political Decision Making, An
Overview and Synthesis of Public Choice Research, |
International
Journal of Economic Policy Studies 3 (2008):
1-30. (Lead Article) |
| 45 |
Book: 40 Years of Research on
Rent Seeking. (2 Volumes) Edited with
introduction by R. D. Congleton, A. L. Hillman and K.
Konrad. Heidelberg: Springer (2008). |
|
| 44 |
America’s
Neglected Debt to the Dutch, An Institutional
Perspective, |
Constitutional
Political Economy 19 (2008): 35-59
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9029-x. |
| 43 |
The Moral
Voter Hypothesis: Economic and Normative Aspects of
Public Policy Formation within Democracies, |
Journal of Public Finance
and Public Choice 25 (2007): 3-30.
(Published in 2008)
|
| 42 |
Informational
Limits to Democratic Public Policy: The Jury Theorem,
Yardstick Competition, and Ignorance, |
Public Choice 132
(2007): 333-352
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9155-z. |
| 41 |
On the
Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit
Costs in Income Security Clubs, |
Constitutional Political
Economy 18 (2007): 145-159
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9018-0. (Lead Article) |
| 40 |
From
Royal to Parliamentary Rule without Revolution, the
Economics of Constitutional Exchange within Divided
Governments, |
European Journal of
Political Economy 23 (2007): 261-284.
(Lead Article)
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.04.002 |
| 39 |
Review of Understanding
Institutional Diversity by Elinor Ostrom. |
Public
Choice 132 (2007): 509-11
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9157-x.
|
| 38 |
Constitutional
Exchange in Japan: from Shogunate to Parliamentary
Democracy, |
Public Choice Studies 47 (2006):
5-29. |
| 37 |
Book: Democratic
Constitutional
Design and Public Policy, Analysis and Evidence.
(Edited with B. Swedenborg) Cambridge Mass: MIT Press
(2006) ISBN 0-262-53280-8. |
Link to Preface
and Table of Contents. |
| 36 |
Introduction:
Rational Choice Politics and Institutions: Toward a
Science of Constitutional Design (with B.
Swedenborg) |
in Democratic Constitutional Design
and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (R. D.
Congleton & B. Swedenborg, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press (2006), Ch. 1: pp. 1-40. |
| 35 |
On
the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Policy Stability
within Partisan Polities |
in Democratic Constitutional Design
and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (R. D.
Congleton & B. Swedenborg, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press (2006), Ch. 6: pp. 184-214. |
| 34 |
Constitutional
Amendment Procedures (with Bjørn Erik Rasch) |
in Democratic Constitutional Design
and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (R. D.
Congleton & B. Swedenborg, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press (2006), Ch. 12: pp. 372-401. |
| 33 |
International
Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations, |
Review of International
Organizations 1 (2006): 319-336
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-006-0236-4. (Lead Article) |
| 32 |
The Story of
Katrina: New Orleans and the Political Economy of
Catastrophe, |
Public Choice 127
(2006): 5-30
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-7729-9. |
| 31 |
Asymmetric
Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization, |
Handbook
of Fiscal Federalism. E. Ahmad and G.
Brosio, Eds., Edward Elgar Publishers, Ltd. (2006):
131-153. |
| 30 |
Toward a
Political Economy of Crisis Management: Rational Choice,
Ignorance, and Haste in Political Decision Making, |
Dynamics
of Intervention, Advances in Austrian Economics, vol 8.
(2005): 183-204. |
| 29 |
The
Globalization of Politics: Rational Choice and the
Internationalization of Public Policy, |
Civilization
10 (2006): 35-45. |
| 28 |
Mutual
Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and
Treaty Organizations: Toward a Logic of Voluntary
Association, |
Rivista di Politica Economica 94
(2004): 49-78. (Published in 2005)
|
| 27 |
Social
Science and History: How Predictable is Political
Behavior? |
in Understanding
Change: Economics, Natural and Social Sciences in
Dialogue. A. Wimmer, Ed. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan (2005): 260-69. |
| 26 |
The
Political Economy of Gordon Tullock, |
Public Choice 121 (2004): 213-38
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-9785-3. |
| 25 |
Toward a
Political Economy of Crisis Management: Rational Choice,
Ignorance, and Haste in Political Decision Making, |
Public
Choice Studies 43 (2004): 5-16.
(Published in Japanese as lead article.) |
| 24 |
Economic
Development and Democracy, Does Industrialization Lead
to Universal Suffrage? |
Homo Oeconomicus 21 (2004):
283-311. |
| 23 |
Chinese Translation of |
Politics
by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory
Democracy. (with James M. Buchanan) Beijing
(2004) ISBN 7801901630. |
| 22 |
Economic
and Cultural Prerequisites for Democracy |
in Rational
Foundations
of Democratic Politics. Breton, A.,
Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., and Wintrobe, R. Eds. New
York: Cambridge University Press (2003): 44-67. |
| 21 |
Book:
Improving Democracy through Constitutional Reform:
Some Swedish Lessons. Kluwer Academic Press,
2003. |
(Link
to English Preface.) |
| 20 |
On the
Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Policy Predictability
within Partisan Polities, |
Year Book of New Political Economy Vol.
22. M. J. Holler, H. Kliemt, D. Schmidtchen, and M.
E. Streit. Eds., Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck. (2003):
29-49. |
| 19 |
Swedish
Translation of |
Improving
Democracy, Att
Förbättra Demokratin was published by SNS Forlag,
2002. See the comments
by
Speaker Sydow of the Riksdag about the Swedish
version of the book, in English.) |
| 18 |
The
Future of Public Choice, |
Public Choice Studies 40 (2003):
5-23. (Published in English, Lead Article) |
| 17 |
The Median Voter Model |
The
Encyclopedia of Public Choice, C. K. Rowley and F.
Schneider, Eds. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press / Springer
(2004), Chapter 142: 707-712. |
| 16 |
Rent Seeking and Political Institutions |
The
Encyclopedia of Public Choice, C. K. Rowley and F.
Schneider, Eds. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press / Springer
(2004), Chapter 180: 824-827. |
| 15 |
Generality and the Efficiency of
Government Decision Making |
The
Encyclopedia of Public Choice, C. K. Rowley and F.
Schneider, Eds. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press / Springer
(2004), Chapter 109: 585-588. |
| 14 |
Environmental Politics and Economic
Development |
The
Encyclopedia of Public Choice, C. K. Rowley and F.
Schneider, Eds. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press / Springer
(2004), Chapter 95: 548-553. |
| 13 |
A Theory
of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political
Agreement, (with Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria) |
Constitutional
Political Economy 14 (2003): 167-90
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024750712089. (Lead article) |
| 12 |
Agency
Problems and the Allocation of International
Environmental Grants: the Return to Rio, |
Economia
Delle Scelte Pubbliche (2002/3): 125-146. |
| 11 |
Tax-Base
Enforcement
and Leviathan: On the Allocation of Tax Enforcement
Effort, |
Public
Finance Review 30 (2002): 456-476. |
| 10 |
Japanese
Translation |
of Economic
Analysis of Rent Seeking
(Edited, with R. D. Tollison) published in Japanese as the
Economics of Rent
Seeking. (H. Kato), Tokyo: Keiso
Shobo, ISBN 4-326-50231-2. 264 pages. (2002) |
| 9 |
Buchanan
and the Virginia School, |
in Method and Morals in
Constitutional Economics. Essays in Honor of James M.
Buchanan. Berlin: Springer Verlag. (2002): 23-38. |
| 8 |
Terrorism,
Interest
Group Politics, and Public Policy: Curtailing Criminal
Modes of Political Speech
(prepublication/final copy) |
Independent
Review (2002):47-67. |
| 7 |
On the
Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between
Dictatorship and Democracy, |
Constitutional
Political Economy 12 (2001): 193-215.
DOI: 10.1023/A:1011605310916 |
| 6 |
The
Politics
of Government Growth, in Shughart, W. F. and
Razzolini L. |
Elgar Companion to Public Choice,
Edward Elgar Publishers, Ltd. (2001): 457-493. |
| 5 |
Help,
Harm or Avoid: On the Personal Advantage of Dispositions
to Cooperate and Punish in Multilateral PD Games with
Exit, (with V. Vanberg) |
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44
(2001): 145-167. |
| 4 |
Governing
the
Global Environmental Commons: The Political Economy of
International Environmental Treaties and Institutions,
in Schulze, G. G. and Ursprung, H. W. Eds. |
Globalization
and
the Environment. New York: Oxford
University Press (2001): 241-263. |
| 3 |
Rational
Ignorance and Rationally Biased Expectations: The
Discrete Informational Foundations of Fiscal Illusion, |
Public Choice 107 (2001): 35-64
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010337412291. |
| 2 |
In
Defense of Ignorance, |
Eastern Economic Journal 27
(2001): 391-407. |
| 1 |
A
Political Efficiency Case for Federalism in
Multinational States: Controlling Ethnic Rent-Seeking, |
Competition and Structure: The
Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in
Honor of Albert Breton. Galeotti, G. Salmon, P. and
Wintrobe, R. (Eds.) New York: Cambridge University Press
(2000): 365-397. |