Roger D. Congleton
|"A Short History of Constitutional Liberalism in America," Constitutional Political Economy (forthcoming 2018)||Book: Oxford Handbook of Public
Choice (w. B. Grofman and S. Voigt) Oxford
University Press (forthcoming 2018)
Link to Preface
Link to Chapter 1 (rationality and politics)
Link to Chapter 27 (rent creation and extraction)
|"Parliaments," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (forthcoming 2018)||"On the Political Economy of Privacy in Communities that Include both Friends and Foes," Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (forthcoming 2018).|
and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A
Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis" ( with DW
Yoo) Journal of Institutional Economics (forthcoming
||“On the Evolution of Organizational Governance,” in Understanding Economic Change: Contributions to an Evolutionary Paradigm in Economics (U. Witt ed), Cambridge University Press (forthcoming 2018).|
The Electoral Politics and Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems. (with A. Batinti and R. Pietrantonio), Kyklos (2017) 70 (4): 483-510.
|“Robert Tollison and the Economics of Politics,” Public Choice, (2017) 171: 23-28.|
|Recently Published (2000-2016)||Working Papers, Etc
(at SSRN) , Most
|Gordon Tullock’s Implicit Analytical History of Government,” Constitutional Political Economy (2016) 27: 179-193.|
|"The Logic of Collective Action and Beyond," Public Choice (2015) 164: 217-34.||Japanese Translation of Perfecting Parliament. A Yokayama, H. Kato and colleagues. Tokyo Keiso Shobo. ISBN978-4-326-50416-9 Fall 2015).|
|“Thanks to Gordon Tullock,” Public Choice (2015) 162:229-33.||Book: Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Edited with A. L. Hillman) Edgar Elgar (2015). [Front Matter/Preface.]|
Constitutional and Fiscal Exchange, and the Political
Economy of Decentralization,. in Ahmad, S. E. and
Multilevel Finance, Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar
(2015, Ch. 6).
||“The Nature of Rent Seeking,” in A Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking. (Edited, with A. Hillman) London: Edward Elgar Press. (2015, ch. 1).|
|“Risk, Uncertainty, and Constitutional Design,” Behind a Veil of Ignorance? Power and Uncertainty in Constitutional Design. L. M. Imbeau and S. Jacob (eds) Edward Elgar (2015, Forward).||."Rent
and Organizational Governance:Limiting Losses from
Intra-Organizational Conflict," Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Edited with A. L. Hillman) Edgar Elgar (2015, ch.27).
|The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan. Constitutional Political Economy (2014) 25: 39-67.||"Coercion, Taxation, and Voluntary Association," in Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance, S. Winner (ed.) Cambridge University Press (2014): Ch. 4.|
|On the Inevitability of Divided Government and Improbability of a Complete Separation of Powers. Constitutional Political Economy (2013) 24: 177-98.||
Is It All about Competence? The Human Capital of U.S. Presidents and Economic Performance. (with Jongjing Zhang) Constitutional Political Economy (2013) 24: 108-24.
and the Modern Welfare State," (with A.
Batinti, F. Bose, Y. Kim, and R. Pietrantonio) in in
Shughart, W. F., L. Razzolini and M. Reksulak (Eds) Elgar Companion
to Public Choice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. (2013, ch. 22).
|"Early Spanish Liberalism and the Constitutional Political Economy, the Cadiz Constitution of 1812," in Cabrillo, F, and Puchades-Navarro M. A. (Eds) Constitutonal Economics and Public Institutions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing (2013, Ch. 4).||On Some
Neglected, But Profound, Contributions of Gordon Tullock,"
in D. Lee (ed.) The
of Public Choice: The Legacy of Buchanan and Tullock.
Hieldelberg: Springer (2013, ch. 3).
|"Growing up with the Calculus of Consent," Public Choice 152 (2012): 273-78.||"The Constitutional Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice 152 (2012): 131-46.|
"On the Political Economy and Limits of Crisis Insurance: the Case of the2008–11 Bailouts." Public Choice 150 (2012): 399-423.
Book. Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the Rise of Western Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2011).
[Link to introduction] [Blurb and book at Amazon] [Link to Tridimas Review in EJPE][Link to Strom Review in PoP]
|"Why Local Governments Do Not Maximize Profits: On the Value Added by the Representative Institutions of Town and City Governance," Public Choice 149 (2011): 187-201.||"Rent Extraction, Liberalism, and Economic Development," in Institutions and National Competitiveness. (Y. B. Choi Ed.). London: Rutledge (2011, ch. 4).|
|"The Rise of the Modern Welfare State, Ideology, Institutions, and Income Security: Analysis and Evidence," (with F. Bose) Public Choice 144 (2010): 535-55.||"The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008," Lessons from the Financial Crisis (R. W. Kolb, Ed.) New York: Wiley and Sons Inc. (2010, pp. 23-9).|
|"Efficient Mercantilism? Revenue-Maximizing Monopolization Policies as Ramsey Taxation" (with Sanghack Lee) European Journal of Political Economy 25 (2009): 102-14.||On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-09. Public Choice 140 (2009): 287-317.|
|"On the Distributional Effects of Political Decision Making, An Overview and Synthesis of Public Choice Research," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies 3 (2008): 1-30. (Lead Article)||Book: 40 Years of Rent Seeking Research. (2 Volumes) Edited with introduction by R. D. Congleton, A. L Hillman and K. Konrad. Heidelberg: Springer (2008).|
|"America’s Neglected Debt to the Dutch, An Institutional Perspective," Constitutional Political Economy 19 (2008): 35-60.||“The
Moral Voter Hypothesis: Economic and Normative Aspects
of Public Policy Formation within Democracies,” Journal of Public Finance
and Public Choice 25 (2007): 3-30. (Published in
|"Informational Limits to Democratic Public Policy: The Jury Theorem, Yardstick Competition, and Ignorance," Public Choice 132 (2007): 333-352.||"On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs," Constitutional Political Economy 18 (2007): 145-159. (Lead Article)|
|"From Royal to Parliamentary Rule without Revolution, the Economics of Constitutional Exchange within Divided Governments," European Journal of Political Economy 23 (2007): 261-284. (Lead Article)||"The Globalization of Politics: Rational Choice and the Internationalization of Public Policy," Civilization 10 (2006): 35-45.|
|"Constitutional Exchange in Japan: from Shogunate to Parliamentary Democracy," Public Choice Studies 47 (2006): 5-29.||Book: Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, Analysis and Evidence. (Edited with B. Swedenborg) Cambridge Mass: MIT Press (2006) ISBN 0-262-53280-8.|
|"International Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations," Review of International Organizations 1 (2006): 319-336. (Lead Article)||Links to Preface and
Table of Contents,
to Introduction and Overview, Chapter 1
to Unbiased Bicameralism, Chapter 6,
to Amendment Procedures, Chapter 12.
|"The Story of Katrina: New Orleans and the Political Economy of Catastrophe," Public Choice 127 (2006): 5-30.||"Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization," Handbook of Fiscal Federalism. E. Ahmad and G. Brosio, Eds., Edgar Elgar Publishers, Ltd. (2006): 131-153.|
|"Toward a Political Economy of Crisis Management: Rational Choice, Ignorance, and Haste in Political Decision Making," Dynamics of Intervention, Advances in Austrian Economics, vol 8. (2005): 183-204.||"Social Science and History: How Predictable is Political Behavior?" in Understanding Change: Economics, Natural and Social Sciences in Dialogue. A. Wimmer, Ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2005): 260-69.|
Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and
Treaty Organizations: Toward a Logic of Voluntary
Association," Revista de Political Economy
(2004): 49-78. (Published in 2005)
||"Toward a Political Economy of Crisis Management: Rational Choice, Ignorance, and Haste in Political Decision Making," Public Choice Studies 43 (2004): 5-16. (Published in Japanese as lead article.)|
"The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice 121 (2004): 213-38.
|Chinese Translation of Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy. (with James M. Buchanan) Beijing (2004) ISBN 7801901630.|
|"Economic Development and Democracy, Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Suffrage?" Homo Economicus 21 (2004): 283-311.|
|"Economic and Cultural Prerequisites for Democracy" in Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics. Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., and Wintrobe, R. Eds. New York: Cambridge University Press (2003): 44-67.||Book: Improving Democracy through Constitutional Reform: Some Swedish Lessons. Kluwer Academic Press, 2003. (Link to English Preface.)|
|"On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Policy Predictability within Partisan Polities," Year Book of New Political Economy Vol. 22. M. J. Holler, H. Kliemt, D. Schmidtchen, and M. E. Streit. Eds., Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck. (2003): 29-54.||Swedish Translation of Improving Democracy, Att Förbättra Demokratin was published by SNS Forlag, 2002. See the comments by Speaker Sydow of the Riksdag about the Swedish version of the book, in English.)|
Future of Public Choice," Public Choice
Studies 40 (2003): 5-23. (Published in
English, Lead Article)
|| Entries for The Encyclopedia of Public Choice,
C. K. Rowley and F. Schneider, Ed.s Kluwer Academic Press
Rent Seeking and Political Institutions
Generality and the Efficiency of Government
Environmental Politics and Economic Development
|"A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement," (with Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria) Constitutional Political Economy 14 (2003): 167-90. (Lead article)||"Agency Problems and the Allocation of International Environmental Grants: the Return to Rio," Economia Delle Scelte Pubbliche (2002/3): 125-146.|
|"Tax-Base Enforcement and Leviathan: On the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort," Public Finance Review 30 (2002): 456-476.||Japanese Translation of Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking (Edited, with R. D. Tollison) published in Japanese as the Economics of Rent Seeking. (H. Kato), Tokyo: Kieso Sobo, ISBN4 326-50231-2. 264 pages. (2002)|
|"Buchanan and the Virginia School," in Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Essays in Honor of James M. Buchanan. Berlin: Springer Verlag. (2002): 23-38.||"Terrorism, Interest Group Politics, and Public Policy: Curtailing Criminal Modes of Political Speech" (prepublication/final copy) Independent Review (2002):47-67.|
|"On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy,"Constitutional Political Economy 12 (2001): 193-215.||"The Politics of Government Growth," in Shughart, W. F. and Razzolini L. Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Edward Elgar Publishers, Ltd. (2001): 457-478.|
|"Help, Harm or Avoid: On the Personal Advantage of Dispositions to Cooperate and Punish in Multilateral PD Games with Exit," (with V. Vanberg) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44 (2001): 145-167.||"Governing the Global Environmental Commons: The Political Economy of International Environmental Treaties and Institutions," in Schulze, G. G. and Ursprung, H. W. Eds. Globalization and the Environment. New York: Oxford University Press (2001): 241-263.|
|"Rational Ignorance and Rationally Biased Expectations: The Discrete Informational Foundations of Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice 107 (2001): 35-64.||"In Defense of Ignorance," Eastern Economic Journal 27 (2001): 391-408.|
|"A Political Efficiency Case for Federalism in Multinational States: Controlling Ethnic Rent-Seeking," Galeotti, G. Slamon, P. and Wintrobe, R. (Eds.) Competition and Structure: The Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in Honor of Albert Breton. New York: Cambridge University Press (2000): 365-397.||
and Presentations (Vita, Books )